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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Plaintiff/Appellant The Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop filed a Notice of Appeal in
the Second District Court on June 24, 2016 (R. 347-348), appealing Judge DiReda's June
7, 2016 order (R. 341-346). Thereafter, the case was assigned to the Utah Court of
Appeals. (R. 349-352, 357.) Appellant filed a Docketing Statement on or about July 14,
2016. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4VJg

I 03(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellant's Opening Brief raises two issues on appeal:
(I) Whether the District Court properly granted Appellee' s Motion to Dismiss 1
(2) Whether the District Court properly denied Appellant's Motion to Amend "on
the basis of futility in reliance on the applicable statute of limitations" (See Opening
Brief, p. 1.)
Concerning Issue no. 1, Appellee agrees that the standard for review 1s
correctness. See S. Jordan City v. Sumrr1:erhays, 2017 UT App 18",

,r

5, 392 P.3d 855

(explaining that because a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question

1

When discussing the first issue presented (Motion to Dismiss), Appellant's Opening
Brief adds the phrase "on the basis that Appellant Frugal Flamingo joined Farm Bureau
as a party to the case after the applicable statute of limitations has expired." As discussed
below, while it is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations had expired on
Frugal Flamingo's claims against Farm Bureau, the lack of any allegations regarding
Farm Bureau in the Complaint served on it was the reason for the trial court granting the
Motion to Dismiss. The fact that the statute of limitations had run deals with the futility
and denial of Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend.
1
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of law, the standard of review is correctness). The controlling authority for Issue no. 1 is
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Concerning Issue no. 2, Appellee agrees that the standard for review is abuse of
direction. See Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Comm. Corp., 2015 UT App 134,

,r 20, 351

P.3d 832 ("We review a district court's denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a
complaint for abuse of discretion.") The controlling authority for Issue no. 2 is Rule 15 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-313(1).
Appellee notes that the applicability, triggering, and running of the statute of
limitations on Appellant's claims are undisputed. Thus, while the application of a statute
of limitations is a question of law reviewed for correctness (see Ottens v. McNeil, 2010
UT App 237,

,r

20, 239 P.3d 308), application of the statute of limitations is being

challenged on appeal. To the extent such application is an issue on appeal in the context
of Appellant's unpreserved relation back argument, Appellee includes the pertinent
standard of review.
STATEMENT REGARDING PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

As discussed below, and as Appellant's own opening brief concedes, the legal
arguments presented by Appellant regarding the issues on appeal were not presented or
preserved below.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES

Determinative statutes and rules in this case include Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-21313 as well as Rules 12 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Full copies of the
text of the statute and rules have been provided in the addendum.
2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

This case arises out of employee theft of a convenience store in Washington
Terrace, Utah. Tytis Shipmon, an employee of Appellant The Frugal Flamingo Quick
Stop ("Frugal Flamingo"), apparently stole a significant amount of cash and merchandise
from the store over several months after being hlred in 2009. (R. 1-7.) Frugal Flamingo
presented a claim to its insurer, Appellee Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
("Farm Bureau") in November 2011. On the same day, Farm Bureau issued and delivered
a check for $5,000.00, the policy limit for the employee dishonesty claim presented.
On December 7, 2011, Frugal Flamingo filed a lawsuit against its former
employee, Mr. Shipmon. More than two years later, on January 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a
motion to join Farm Bureau as a party to the action, to protects its insurer's subrogation
interests. The Court entered an Order joining Farm Bureau as a party on August 31, 2015.
(R. 203-205.) On September 23, 2015, Frugal Flamingo served Farm Bureau's registered
agent with a copy of the Order and Complaint (R 245-259), which neither named Farm
Bureau, nor set forth any allegations or causes of action as to Farm Bureau.
Thereafter counsel for Farm Bureau requested - in a telephone call and subsequent
two letters - that Frugal Flamingo identify what allegations pertained to Farm Bureau.
After months of no response, Farm Bureau filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on
December 11, 2015. In response, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint on
January 11, 2016. After briefing on the motions was complete, Judge DiReda held a
hearing on May 4, 2016. After the parties presented argument, Judge DiReda granted
3
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Farm Bureau's Motion to Dismiss and denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, which rulings
are the subject of this appeal. Though Appellant has included Tytis Shipmon on the
caption of its brief, he is not a party to this appeal.

2.

Statement of Facts

1.

Appellant (and Plaintiff in the underlying case) Frugal Flamingo 1s a

convenience store located in Washington Terrace, Utah. (R. 1-7.)
2.

In approximately 2009, Appellant hired Tytis Shipmon. (R. 1-7.)

3.

Frugal Flamingo claims that via security footage, it became aware of Mr.

Shipmon stealing cash, tobacco, alcohol, food, drinks, merchandise, and other items from
the store over a period of approximatively thirteen months. (R. 1-7, 309-310.)
4.

In a notarized statement on the letterhead of Frugal Flamingo's counsel

dated November 11, 2011, Frugal Flamingo set forth the basis for a claim of damage
caused by employee dishonesty and theft from the premises totaling $121,327.29. (R.
309-310.)
5.

At the time surrounding the claimed theft, Frugal Flamingo had an

insurance policy in place with Appellee Farm Bureau. (R. 268-297.)
6.

That policy included coverage for employee dishonesty. (R. 294-295.)

7.

The policy limit for employee dishonesty was $5,000. (R. 273.)

8.

On November 15, 2011, pursuant to this coverage and the terms and

conditions of the policy, Fann Bureau paid Frugal Flamingo $5,000 for the claim it made
concerning the employee dishonesty of Mr. Shipmon. (R. 299.)
9.

On December 7, 2011, Frugal Flamingo filed suit in the underlying case
4
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(Case no. 110908653) against Mr. Shipmon as the sole defendant. (R. 1-7.)
10.

The Complaint contained three causes of action against Mr. Shipmon

(conversion, fraud, and civil conspiracy) and sought actual damages for theft in the
amount of $121,327.29, together with attorney's fees and costs. (R. 1-7.)
11.

The Complaint raises no allegations or causes of action as to Farm Bureau,

neither does it reference insurance or identify Farm Bureau by name. (R. 1-7.)
12.

The underlying case proceeded and was twice scheduled on the trial court's

calendar for dismissal for failure to prosecute. (R. 29-30, 43-44.)
13.

On January 27, 2014 (twenty-five months after the lawsuit commenced),

Frugal Flamingo filed a motion and memorandum seeking to join Farm Bureau as a party
in the action. (R. 36-40.) According to the reasoning of Frugal Flamingo in the
memorandum, it sought to protect the interests of Farm Bureau for potential
indemnification and rights against Tytis Shipmon:
Accordingly, it should be allowed to be joined in this action to preserve its
rights against Mr. Shipmon. If Farm Bureau is not allowed to join this
lawsuit, their ability to seek indemnification against defendant may· be
compromised ...
As both the Frugal Flamingo and Farm Bureau have an interest in securing
a judgment against Defendant for the funds lost and because all losses arise
of the same transaction and occurrence, it is appropriate that Farm Bureau
be joined as a party to this action.
(R. 39.)

14.

Frugal Flamingo made no specific allegation against Farm Bureau, nor did

it seek leave to bring any claim against Farm Bureau at the time of filing this January
2014 motion and memorandum. (R. 36-40.)
5
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15.

Farm Bureau was not given notice of the request by Plaintiff to join it as a

party. (R. 40.)
16.

On September 5, 2014, Frugal Flamingo requested that the court schedule a

pre-trial conference to set the matter for trial. (R. 4 5.) Thereafter, the court scheduled a
telephonic pre-trial conference to discuss the specifics of a trial setting. (R. 51-52.) The
pre-trial conference was continued twice, but the case was eventually set for a two-day
bench trial on July 20-21, 2015. (R. 53-57.)
17.

Gi.i

At the pre-trial conference on June 10, 2015, Frugal Flamingo presented a

document entitled "Agreement to Judgment and Settlement" dated June 10, 2015 and
signed by Mr. Shipmon. (R. 59, 60-61.)
18.

In that agreement, Mr. Shipmon stipulated to judgment in the amount of

$233,421.14 due to his theft. (R. 60-61.) An accompanying 128 pages outlined the items
stolen between January 5, 2010 and February 15, 2011, and their values. (R. 60-61, 62189.) Mr. Shipmon agreed to liquidate his retirement funds to pay the agreed-upon
amount. (R. 61.)
19.

Judge DiReda struck the bench trial from the court's calendar in lieu of the
~

judgment/stipulation signed by Shipmon. (R. 59.)
20.

On August 26, 2015, Frugal Flamingo submitted its Motion to Join Parties

for decision, which motion had been filed nineteen months earlier. (R. 192-193.) Frugal
Flamingo also submitted a proposed order entitled "Order Joining Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company'' (R. 194-196.)
21.

The proposed order indicates it was mailed to Farm Bureau's registered
6
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agent (R. 196); however, Farm Bureau had not been given notice of the motion and
therefore would not have been aware of the same. (R. 343.)
22.

The Court entered the "Order Joining Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance

Company'' on August 31, 201~. (R. 203-205.)
23.

At that point, the court docket indicated that Farm Bureau was added as

"Other Party," not "Defendant." (See Trial Court Docket-Addendum.)
24.

On September 23, 2015, Frugal Flamingo served Farm Bureau's registered

agent with a copy of the 8/31/15 Order, civil cover sheet, and Complaint (R. 206, 245259), which neither named Farm Bureau, nor set forth any allegations or causes of action
as to Farm Bureau. (R. 248-254.)
25.

Thereafter, counsel for Farm Bureau, having received the Order and

Complaint, contacted counsel for Frugal Flamingo by telephone and e-mailed letter on
October 14, 2015:
This letter will confirm our conversation today and the fact that I have been
asked to represent Farm Bureau in this matter ...
I asked you if there had been an amended complaint because I did not see
allegations in your complaint directed to Fann Bureau. It is my
understanding that you are going to get back to me regarding the current
status of allegations against my client and then we can respond
appropriate! y. (R. 214.)
26.

After no response, counsel for Farm Bureau sent another e-mailed letter on

November 4, 2015:
We spoke on October 14th and I sent you a letter confirming that
conversation and the fact that there were no allegations against my client
Farm Bureau in the complaint that had been filed. I have not heard a
response to my letter and my request to know what the allegations are
7
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against Farm Bureau.
Please let me know if you intend to file an Amended Complaint with
allegations against Farm Bureau or a voluntary dismissal of my client.
(R. 216.)
27.

After additional time with no response, Farm Bureau filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss on December 11, 2015, on the basis that even accepting all allegations
in the Complaint served on Farm Bureau as true, the Complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted as to Farm Bureau, since Farm Bureau was not
mentioned in the Complaint. (R. 207-216.)
28.

In response, Plaintiff filed a combined "Response to Motion to Dismiss and

Counter Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint" and supporting memorandum on
January 11, 2016. (R. 236-238, 232-235.)
29.

Frugal Flamingo's concurrently filed proposed Amended Complaint

contains the original three causes of action against Mr. Shipmon, while also asserting
three new causes of action against Farm Bureau: breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith. (R. 219-231.)
30.

The Prayer for Relief in the Amended Complaint indicates that Frugal

Flamingo sought $233,421.14 from Farm Bureau in addition to "actual, consequential,
special, punitive and incidental damages." (R. 230.)
31.

In the Motion to Amend, Frugal Flamingo argues that "the proposed

amendment does not alter the general substance of the allegations but simply and more
clearly identifies Plaintiff's specific claims against Defendant Farm Bureau." (R. 233.)

8
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32.

Fann Bureau, in opposing Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, argued that the

same should be denied on the basis of futility because the three-year statute of limitations
applicable to Fann Bureau's first-party insurance claims had expired prior to Frugal
Flamingo filing its Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. 260-299.)
33.

Fann Bureau's opposition also addressed Frugal Flamingo's inaccurate

representation of the nature of the amendment and argued that amendment was not
justified under the factors considered by Utah courts: timeliness, justification, and
prejudice (which Frugal Flamingo failed to meaningfully address). (R. 260-299.)
34.

After briefing on the two motions was complete, Judge DiReda scheduled a

hearing for May 4, 2016. (R. 304-306, 307.)
35.

In reviewing Frugal Flamingo's stated basis for moving to add Fann

Bureau as a party (R. 39), Judge DiReda stated the following at the hearing:
What's interesting to me is that [Frugal Flamingo's counsel] wasn't the
attorney for Fann Bureau and yet his reason for wanting to join them was to
protect their interests.
As [Farm Bureau's counsel] points out, the reasoning set forth in your
motion has nothing whatsoever to do with ultimately the amended
complaint that you filed. The amended complaint seeks to recover for
causes of· action that actually run against Farm Bureau. And yet in your
motion to join them you speak to wanting to join them to protect their
interest, the indemnification interest that they may have. And to me that
seems misleading. It's like hey, we just want to bring them in so their
interest is protected. And then when you file the amended complaint to join
them you then allege breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing... But it's almost like kind of a bait and switch of
sorts ... Here, Judge, here's the reason, it's really very innocent and noble
of us. But all the while the underlying reason is to go after them.
(R. 372, 380-381.)
9
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36.

One of the areas Judge DiReda focused on during the May 4, 2016 was

notice. Judge DiReda remarked, and Frugal Flamingo's counsel agreed, that notice to Mr.
Shipmon was not notice to Farm Bureau, to which Frugal Flaming's counsel agreed:
THE JUDGE: ... Notifying Mr. Shipmon and his counsel was not the same
thing as notifying Farm BureauMR. COWDIN: Right.
THE JUDGE: --and its counsel ... (R. 379.)
37.

Frugal Flamingo's counsel also acknowledged that Mr. Shipmon could not

bind Farm Bureau to a judgement: "Now, I understand that Mr. Shipmon can't agree to a
judgment on behalf of Farm Bureau ... " (R. 383.)
38.

Discussing the procedural history of the case, Judge DiReda stated the

following:
I'm so, I'm so troubled by the procedural history in this case. I mean, I don't
think it's an overstatement to say this case is a mess. . . Because even after
four years down the road when you, when you filed the motion, you don't
initially say we're filing the motion to join Farm Bureau because we believe
they have breached their contract with us. The statement in the motion is
we want them to, we want to protect their indemnification rights. And that
to me is troubling.
The second layer that is troubling is the fact that they weren't given notice
of the motion in the first place. Now, you've tried to save yourself by saying
well, but we sent them the order. But you didn't send them the motion. And
even if you had they probably would have said oh, okay, well they're just
trying to protect us, we're probably not going to oppose that. If you had
raised the issue in the motion that you wanted to bring them in because you
felt they had breached their agreement I have no doubt they would have
filed a memorandum in opposition to that motion for joinder.
But then here is the other part that troubles me. After you get your order
joining them you don't file an amended complaint to allege the causes of
action that pertain to Farm Bureau. The complaint that you originally filed
remains and there is nothing in that complaint that says anything about
Farm Bureau. Right. And so you don't do anything until [Farm Bureau's
10
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counsel] brings his motion to dismiss and says now wait a second, we've
looked at the complaint and there's absolutely no mention in it of Farm
Bureau at all, so why are we being joined here, this doesn't even make
sense. And it's only at that point that then you seek to amend the complaint
to allege these causes of action that pertain to the insurance company. I
mean, I'm just so troubled by the, it just seems, there's such a disconnect all
the way through. And I don't know, and I'm certainly not pointing a finger
at you. But I'm just wondering if you can offer me any sort of insight or
explanation that will cause me to look at this differently. Because right now
as I look at it I think this is a mess, from the get go it's a mess.
It's almost as though plaintiff did not perceive the need to file a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint until it was tipped off in the motion to
dismiss that the complaint was defective. And it didn't list Farm Bureau and
didn't list any allegations. And then it's like, it's almost like an epiphany, oh,
yes, we've got to, we've got to amend the complaint and we've got to add
them, and we've got to put in the reasons why we're adding them. Which,
by the way, are reasons not articulated in the original motion for joinder.
And that's troubling to me.
(R. 396-398, 415.)
39.

During the May 4, 2016 hearing, counsel for Frugal Flamingo agreed that

Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-313(1)(a) applied to Frugal Flamingo's claims against Farm
Bureau and that the statute of limitations had run in November 2014:
THE JUDGE: Do you agree the statute of limitations is a three year statute?
Are we on the same pag~?
MR. COWDIN: I recognize the statute, Your Honor, yes.
THE JUDGE: Okay. I just want to make sure that that that part isn't in
dispute. You aclmowledge 3 l-21-313(l)(a)?
MR. COWDIN: Relating to insurance contracts.
THE JUDGE: Yes.
MR. COWDIN: Correct, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE: Okay. Fine. And, and assuming again for the sake of
discussion that November 2011 is the date that I find the cause of action
accrued, began, you would concede that the amended complaint is outside
of that statute of limitations?
MR. COWDIN: November 2014. Correct, Your Honor.
(R. 403-404.)
11
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40.

Judge DiReda stated that because Farm Bureau was not notified of the

motion to add parties, the court should not have entered the order joining Farm Bureau as
a party in the case. (R. 410.)
41.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge DiReda ruled from the bench

granting Farm Bureau's Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend (R.
415-416.) In doing so, Judge DiReda stated the following:
I'm going to find, among other things, that the cause of action in this
particular case against Farm Bureau commenced in November of 2011 ...
Accordingly, the court applying the statute of limitations that is contained
within 31-21-313(l)(a), three year statute of limitations, finds that the
motion to amend and the corresponding amended complaint needed to be
filed by November of 2014 .
. . .it is undisputed that the motion to amend in this case was not filed until
January 2016, well beyond the three year statute of limitations.
The court would further find that the contents of the motion referenced
joining Farm Bureau for the purpose of protecting its interests, its right to
reimbursement or rather indemnification, and that's the extent of what this
motion references. There is no reference in the argument section of this
motion to Frugal Flamingo's intent to join Farm Bureau for the purpose of
pursuing an action against them.· .. When the documents were ultimately
served on Farm Bureau, Farm Bureau was served with the original
complaint which doesn't name it in the complaint and has no allegations
within the complaint that referenced Farm Bureau. (R. 410, 412-414.)
42.

The order memorializing Judge DiReda's ruling was entered on June 7,

2016. (R. 341-346.) After discussing the history of the case, the last paragraph of the
order states as follows:
Based upon the undisputed facts and procedural steps outlined, the Court
concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiff was required to have brought any
claims and causes of action against Farm Bureau by November 15, 2014.
Based upon the fact that the first assertion of any claims against Farm
Bureau occurred January 11, 2016, any such claims are time barred by the
12
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aforementioned statute of limitations. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss
Farm Bureau is well taken and the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied as
futile - barred by the Statute of Limitations under Title §31-21-313(l)(a).
Further, even if not time barred, the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is not
timely nor does the Court find any justification for Plaintiffs delay in
waiting to file the same until January 11, 2016. (R. 344.)
43.

The June 7, 2016 order was approved as to form by counsel for Frugal

Flamingo. (R. 346.)
44.

Frugal Flamingo filed a Notice of Appeal on June 24, 2016. (R. 347-348.)

45.

Although Appellant has included Tytis Shipman on the caption of its brief,

he is not a party to this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Concerning the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court's decision to grant the motion
was correct because Frugal Flamingo's Complaint contained no allegations or causes of
action against Farm Bureau. As such, the Complaint "fail[ ed] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted" as to Farm Bureau. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In regards to the Motion to Amend Complaint, the trial court's ruling was not an
abuse of discretion because amendment was futile. It is absolute common ground in this
(@

appeal that (I) th·e three-year statute of limitations (Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-313(l)(a))
applies to Frugal Flamingo's claims against Farm Bureau; and (2) the statute of
limitations expired before Frugal Flamingo ever sought to raise a claim against Farm
Bureau. Appellant's only contrary argument on appeal- the relation back doctrine - was
not presented or preserved below. Even if this Court were to consider relation back, Utah
case law shows the doctrine has no application to the law or facts in this case.
13
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Additionally, the amendment Frugal Flamingo sought was not timely, neither was
the delay justified. Frugal Flamingo has not challenged the trial court's ruling on that
basis on appeal.
As discussed further below, the trial court correctly granted Farm Bureau's Motion
to Dismiss. The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint was not an
abuse of discretion. The rulings of the trial court were proper and should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED FARM BUREAU'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The trial court correctly granted Farm Bureau's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Farm
Bureau's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Complaint served on Farm Bureau
contained no allegations or causes of action against it. Thus, even accepting all
allegations in the Complaint as true as Rule 12(b)( 6) requires, there was no claim against
Farm Bureau upon which relief could be granted and thus the Complaint was properly
dismissed as to Farm Bureau.
After filing suit solely against Tytis Shipmon, Frugal Flamingo sought to add
Farm Bureau as a party more than two years later. Frugal Flamingo's stated grounds for
joinder was so Farm Bureau's ability to seek indemnification against Mr. Shipmon would
not be compromised. Nineteen months later, Frugal Flamingo submitted its Motion to
Join Parties for decision. The same month, the trial court entered the "Order Joining Farm
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Bureau Mutual Insurance Company." 2 The following month, Frugal Flamingo served
Farm Bureau's registered agent with a copy of the Order Joining Farm Bureau, Civil
Cover Sheet, and Complaint, which did not name Farm Bureau or contain any allegations
or causes of action as to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau thereafter retained counsel to
represent it in the case, but after a telephone conversation about the lack of allegations
against Farm Bureau and two unanswered letters following up on that issue, Farm Bureau
vP

filed its Motion to Dismiss, which the trial court granted.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures entitles a defendant to
dismissal of an action filed against it when a plaintiffs complaint "fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should
be granted when, "assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep 't of

Natural Res., 2010 UT 14,

,r

10, 228 P.3d 747. Said another way, "[a] Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs
right to relief based on those facts." Oakwood Viii. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT
~

101,

,r 8,

104 P.3d 1226. The question of whether a complaint "was properly dismissed

for failure to state a claim is a question of law ... review[ed] for correctness." Davis v.

Central Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 52, ,r 16, 147 P.3d 390.

2

The text of the order did not identify Farm Bureau as a defendant, simply "a party,"
neither did the caption list Farm Bureau as a defendant. This is consistent with the court
docket thaflisted Farm Bureau as "Other Party," not "Defendant."
15
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The only Complaint on record in the underlying case - and the Complaint served
on Farm Bureau- raises allegations solely against Mr. Shipman. It offers no statement of
a claim showing how Plaintiff is entitled to relief against Fann Bureau and fails to even
mention Farm Bureau. 3 The Complaint does not alert Farm Bureau to any claims against
it or a basis for claimed damages. Therefore, even assuming the truth of the allegations of
the Complaint - i.e. that Frugal Flamingo's former employee, Mr. Shipmon, stole cash
and merchandise from the convenience store - there are no claims or causes of action
raised against Farm Bureau, only Mr. Shipman. As such, Farm Bureau was properly
dismissed as a party to the underlying case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Frugal Flamingo's failure to allege a claim against Farm Bureau in the Complaint
rendered the inclusion of Farm Bureau in the underlying action defective under a Rule
12(b)(6) analysis. The trial court's grant of the Motion to Dismiss was correct and should
be affirmed on appeal. 4

3

It is undisputed that the original Complaint did not (a) name Farm Bureau as a party; (b)
identify Farm Bureau as a defendant; (c) use the words "Farm Bureau"; (d) mention or
discuss insurance; or (e) set forth any allegations against Farm Bureau.
4
While Appellant first raises relation back in the section of its brief addressing the
Motion to Dismiss (see Opening Brief, p. 6), Farm Bureau believes that inclusion of that
argument in response to its motion confuses the issues on appeal. The expiration of the
statute of limitations on Frugal Flamingo's claims against Farm Bureau certainly serves
as additional support for the trial court granting the Motion to Dismiss. However, the
statute of limitations argument was only raised as a basis for futility in response to Frugal
Flamingo's Motion to Amend (R. 262-263), and was not raised in Farm Bureau's Motion
to Dismiss or Reply (R. 207-211, 239-243.)
16
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II.

IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DENY FRUGAL FLAMINGO'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY WAS NOT
PRESENTED BELOW AND FAILS SUBSTANTIVELY.
The trial court's ruling to deny Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend was not an

abuse of discretion. The parties agree that Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend and
proposed Amended Complaint, raising allegations against Farm Bureau for the first time,
were filed after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. It was upon that
basis that the trial court denied Frugal Flamingo's motion since amendment would be
futile. Rather, Appellant argues - for the first time on appeal - that its claims against
Farm Bureau "relate back" to the date of the original Complaint against Mr. Shipmon,
such that its claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
As set forth below, Frugal Flamingo's argument regarding the relation back
doctrine should not be considered because it was not presented or preserved below.
However, even if relation back is considered on appeal, it is clear the doctrine does not
apply to the law or facts of this case.

A.

Amendment Was Futile.

While under Rule 15 leave to amend is "freely given," that leave has several
established limits under Utah law, one of which is futility of the amendment. See Jensen

v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ,I 139, 82 P.3d 1076, 1102 ("Although leave to amend
is 'freely given when justice so requires,' justice does not require that leave be given 'if
doing so would be futile."'). See also Anda/ex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046

17
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(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (specifying that leave to amend should not be given if newly
asserted claim is legally insufficient or futile); Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West

Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998) (explaining that futility of an amendment is
a valid basis for denial of a motion to amend); Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68,

iJ

15,243 P.3d 1275.
Amendment of the Complaint in the underlying action was futile because any
claims that Frugal Flamingo believed it had against Farm Bureau were barred by the
statute of limitations. Frugal Flamingo conceded below, and does not challenge on
appeal, that the three-year statute of limitations regarding first-party insurance claims Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(l)(a) - applies to its claims against Farm Bureau and
expired in November 2014. 5 Thus, if Frugal Flamingo believed the amount paid by Farm
Bureau in November 2011 was somehow not in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the policy, Frugal Flamingo had three years, or until November 2014, to raise a claim
against Farm Bureau. Frugal Flamingo's failure to do so until January 2016 (the filing of
the Countermotion6 for Leave to Amend and proposed Amended Complaint), time barred
its claims against Farm Bureau, making amendment futile. If the trial court had allowed
5

The proposed Amended Complaint sought to assert three causes of action against Farm
Bureau: breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and bad faith. (R. 219-231.) These are first-party claims that Frugal Flamingo sought to
raise against its own insurer. See e.g. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985). If desired, legal analysis of the application and timing of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A21-313( l )(a) can be found at page 263 in the record.
6As Fann Bureau pointed out below (R. 261-262), Frugal Flamingo's decision to file a
countermotion was procedurally improper. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(n) ("A party may not
make a motion in a memorandum opposing a motion or in a reply memorandum").
Plaintiff also filed a separate motion and memorandum, which was no longer allowed
under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(l).
18
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amendment, Farm Bureau would have simply filed a dispositive motion, which would
have been granted on the same basis that the Motion to Amend was denied: expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations.
The trial court's legal determination that amendment of the Complaint was futile
was correct. Therefore, the denial of Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend was not an
abuse of discretion.

B.

The Relation Back Doctrine Should Be Disregarded Since That
Argument Was Not Presented Or Preserved Below. There Was No
Plain Error.

On appeal, Frugal Flamingo tries to avoid the statute of limitations by arguing the
relation back doctrine, which it freely admits it did not present to the trial court below.
This argument should be disregarded under clear Utah precedent.
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held they "will not consider issues on appeal
that were not preserved below." See State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187, iJ 5, 283 P.3d 543.
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presenteq to the trial court in
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See 438 Main St. v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, iJ 51, 99 P.3d 801. The preservation standard is high, which
~

Frugal Flamingo has not and cannot meet. See e.g. Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs.,
2013 UT 60, iJ 46, 321 P .3d 1054 (holding that to be properly preserved, an issue must be
timely raised, specifically raised, and sufficiently supported).
Instead, Frugal Flamingo argues that the trial court's failure to consider relation
back on its own was "plain error." To establish plain error, it is Frugal Flamingo's burden
to establish (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
19
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and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the party. See In re Guardianship ofA.TIG., 2012 UT 88, 1
22, 293 P.3d 276, 283.
Regarding the first prong of the test, alleged failure of the trial court to consider
any effect of the relation back doctrine was not error because that legal doctrine does not
apply to this case, as addressed in Section II(C) of the Argument below. Regarding the

second prong, while Frugal Flamingo argues that failure to consider relation back was
"obvious" because it is found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is certainly not the
responsibility of judges to consider whether every subpart of the 108 rules of civil
procedure might apply to a given case (especially when the party is represented by
counsel). Finally, regarding the third prong, any alleged error was not harmful because
application of the doctrine would not have changed the outcome of the case since there
was no identity of interest, as addressed in Section II(C) of the Argument below.

C.

Relation Back Does Not Apply To This Case Because There Is No
Identity of Interest Between Mr. Shipmon and Farm Bureau.

Relation back should not be considered because it was not presented or preserved
below. However~ even if the Court were to consider it on appeal, such an argument fails
substantively because there is no identity of interest.
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the relation back of
amendments to pleadings. It sets forth the certain circumstances under which an
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). To
allow relation back, a plaintiff must show misnomer or the identity-of-interest exception.
20
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See Sweat v. Boeder, 2013 UT App 206,

ifil 6-8, 309 P.3d 295. On appeal, Frugal

Flamingo asserts only identity of interest. (See Opening Brief, p. 8.)
An identity of interest exists when "the real parties in_ interest were sufficiently
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early stage."
Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, ,r 9, 71 P.3d 631. The reasoning behind the exception

is that "it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial." Id. (internal
citations omitted). In this case, Farm Bureau was not sufficiently alerted to the legal
proceedings and was not involved in them from an early stage. Farm Bureau issued a
$5,000 payment the same day its insured made a claim for employee theft and dishonesty,
believing the issue to be resolved. That payment was tendered a month before the lawsuit
was originally filed. It was not alerted to the proceedings against Mr. Shipmon. In fact,
Farm Bureau did not hear from Frugal Flamingo again until four years later when it was
served with a Complaint that did not raise any allegations against it. Even if Farm Bureau
had been notified of Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Join Parties, it would not have been
sufficiently alerted to the nature of the eventual claims since the stated grounds were to
protect the insured's indemnification interests.
Utah appellate decisions confirm that relation back and identity of interest have no
application in this case. In Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157,

,r

19, 71 P.3d 631,

Penrose timely sued Christopher Ross after being in a car accident. After the statute of
limitations ran, Penrose amended the complaint to add Ross's son, Bryant, who was
actually driving the car that hit Penrose's car in the accident. The son moved for
summary judgment claiming the statute of limitations had expired. In response, Penrose
21
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argued relation back since (1) the father was served at the same residence as the son, (2)
the father knew the son was driving his car and was in an accident, (3) the father knew he
was not the driver involved in the accident, (4) the son was insured by the father's
insurer, and (5) the father and son had the same attorney. This Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that there was no identity of interest despite these facts, explaining that
"[r]elation as father and son and [the father's] possible knowledge of the Original
Complaint [were] insufficient to create a legal identity of interest in the lawsuit." Id. at ,r
21. See also Sweat, 2013 UT App 206,309 P.3d 295 (holding the same on similar facts).
In Wright v. PK Transp., 2014 UT App 93, 325 P.3d 894, a plaintiff motorist
timely filed an action against a shipping company and its driver for injuries sustained in a
motor vehicle accident. After the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff sued the
owners of the sod and trailer being hauled by the original defendants. The owners filed a
motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs claims against them were time-barred.
The plaintiff conceded the statute of limitatio~s had run on his claims against the owners,
but argued relation back and identity of interest. The trial court granted the owners'
dispositive motion - despite the original defendants attempting to allocate fault to the
owners and the fact that plaintiff deposed one of the owners nine months before naming
him in the suit - which ruling this Court affirmed.
In Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 977 P .2d 497, a wrongful ~eath case
where there was identity of interest, this Court applied the relation back doctrine to
defendants added after the statute of limitations because the newly added parties were the
parents of the timely sued tortfeasors (who were minor children) and because the parents
22
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themselves had been served with the complaint when the action was originally filed.
Based on the facts and legal arguments presented in these and other identity of
interest cases in Utah, it is clear that application of the relation back doctrine is not
warranted in this case, even if this Court were to consider that argument on appeal.
Perhaps this is best evidenced by Frugal Flamingo's own counsel's admission at the May
4, 2016 hearing that notice to Mr. Shipmon was not notice to Farm Bureau (R. 379.)
Frugal Flamingo's last ditch effort to avoid the consequences of the statute of limitations,
which it admits applies and expired, fails. The trial court's denial of the Motion to
Amend was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 7

7

As discussed in other identity of interest of interest cases, Frugal Flamingo must prove
(1) the amended pleading alleges only claims that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth in the original pleading and (2) the added party received actual or
constructive notice that it would have been a proper party to the original pleading. See
Ottens at iJ43. Regarding the first requirement, the proposed Amended Complaint set
forth many claims that did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrenc~ as
the original Complaint (i.e. employee theft vs. interpretation of a policy and handling of
an insurance claim). Regarding the second requirement, Frugal Flamingo cannot establish
notice. Frugal Flamingo argues only constructive notice, claiming that "Farm Bureau had
constructive knowledge of the allegations by Frugal Flamingo following the submission
of [the insurance] claim." A way to establish constructive notice is to prove "that the
original and new. party share 'the same interest' concerning the litigation, including their
legal defenses and positions such that 'notice of the action against one serves to provide
notice of the action to the other."' Id. at ,r 45 (emphasis added) (quoting Penrose at ilil
15-19). This method of proving constructive notice is known as the "Notice Transfer
Test." Id. Frugal Flamingo's argument fails because Mr. Shipmon and Farm Bureau do
not share the "same interest," as evidenced by the differing legal defenses and positions
they would have. Mr. Shipmon' s legal position would consist of defenses to theft and
perhaps valuation whereas Farm Bureau's defenses would be that the terms of the
insuring agreement were not breached and that the claim was fairly debatable under Utah
law. These are vastly differently legal interests and positions. Frugal Flamingo fails to
address this important issue. See also Sweat, 2013 UT App 206, ,r 9, 309 P.3d 295
("Because the parties do not have the same legal interest there is no identity of interest.")
23
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III.

APPELLANT CHALLENGES ONLY ONE OF THE INDEPENDENT
GROUNDS FORMING THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL
OF THE MOTION TO AMEND.
In addition to Farm Bureau's previous arguments on why this Court should affirm

the trial court's denial of Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend, the ruling should also be
affirmed because Frugal Flamingo has only challenged one of the two independent bases
on which the trial court made that ruling.
Frugal Flamingo's second issue on appeal is "[ w]hether the District Court
improperly denied Appellant Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend Complaint on the

basis of futility in reliance on the applicable statute of limitations." (See Appellant's
Brief, p. 1) (emphasis added). Futility/the statute of limitations was not the only basis for
denying Frugal Flamingo's Motion to Amend. As the June 7, 2016 order states, "even if
not time barred, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is not timely nor does the Court find any
justification for Plaintiff's delay in waiting to file the same until January 11, 2016." (R.
344.) This order was approved as to form by Frugal Flamingo's counsel. (R. 346.) Frugal
Flamingo does not challenge this basis for the trial court's ruling, which is fatal to its
second issue on appeal since "[t]his court will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that
Utah law also prevents relation back when adding new parties "amount[s] to the assertion
of a new cause of action" because the purpose of the statute of limitation would be
defeated." Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added).
Thus another reason why identity of interest does not apply is because the proposed
Amended Complaint sought to add new, fundamentally different causes of action against
Farm Bureau that those set forth in the original Complaint: conversion, fraud, and civil
conspiracy pled against Mr. Shipmen in forty-six paragraphs seeking actual damages for
theft vs. six causes of action including breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith against Farm Bureau pled in eighty-three
paragraphs seeking consequential and punitive damages.
24
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rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of those
grounds." Salt Lake Cty. v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30,, 28,
297 P.3d 38.
Frugal Flamingo's brief makes only cursory, conclusory statements regarding the
amendment factors of timeliness justification, and timeliness, mistakenly arguing that
"[t]o be certain, there were no other issue [sic] prohibiting the granting of Frugal
~

Flamingo's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint." (See Opening Brief, p. 11.)8 Having
failed to address these points and challenge the trial court's ruling on the same, Frugal
Flamingo cannot seek to do so now. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,, 8, 194 P.3d 903
("It is well settled that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not

presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court.") Therefore, separate and apart from the futility and relation back issues,
Frugal Flamingo cannot prevail on its attempt to reverse the trial court's denial of the
Motion to Amend.

8

This is but one of several examples to which Appellee could point for the fact that
Appellant's scant factual presentation and legal analysis is inadequate, attempting to pass
on the "heavy lifting" to the Utah Court of Appeals, which Utah appellate courts have
held is improper. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, if 21, 147 P.3d 448; Niemela v.
Imperial Mfg., Inc., 2011 UT App 333, iJ 24, 263 P.3d 1191. Frugal Flamingo's Opening
Brief contains little or no meaningful discussion and analysis on several points such as
the abuse of discretion standard of review, plain error, relation back, and identity of
interest. Other times, Frugal Flamingo cites a case with no analysis or even a
parenthetical explanation. This is not sufficient. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,, 9, 194
P.3d 903 (explaining that the Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that a brief is
inadequate if it merely contains bald citations to authority [without] development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority" (alteration in original; internal
quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the rulings of the
trial court be affirmed.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2017.

By_.#-JC---'"'-~'----4---=-#JC-----1---Pa 1 M. Belnap
Nicholas E. Dudoich
Attorneys for Appellee Farm Bureau

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(l)
I hereby certify that:
1.

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.

24(f)(l) because this brief contains 8,745 words (14,000 maximum).
2.

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.

27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft Word 2016 in 13 point Times New Roman.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2017.

BY--------~---------p ul M. Belnap

Nicholas E. Dudoich
Attorneys for Appellee Farm Bureau

27
vb

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of June, 2017, two true and correct copies of
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ADDENDUM
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Judge DiReda' s June 7, 2016 Order
(R. 341-346.)

2.

Transcript of May 4, 2016 Hearing
(R. 366-417.)

3.

Notarized Statement- November 11, 2011
(R. 309-310.)

4.

$5,000 Check to Frugal Flamingo- November 11,201 I
(R. 299.)

5.

Motion to Join Fann Bureau as Party
(R. 36-40.)

6.

Return of Service and Documents served on Fann Bureau's registered agent
on September 23, 2015
(R. 245-259.)

7.

Proposed Amended Complaint
(R. 219-231.)

8.

Trial Court Docket

9.

Full text of:
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-313
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Nicholas E. Dudoich, #14170
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (80 I) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
pbelnap@strongandhanni.com
ndudoich@strongandhanni.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QIBCK STOP,
Plaintiff,

v.
TYTIS SHIPMON AND FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS
AGAINST FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Case No. 110908653
Judge: Michael DiReda

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 4th day of May, 2016, at
the hour of2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Michael DiReda, District Court Judge. The Plaintiff
lill)

was represented by its counsel of record, Jacob K. Cowdin, and the Defendant Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company was represented by its counsel, Paul M. Belnap. The matter before
the Court was the Motion to Dismiss of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company and Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend the Complaint to Assert Claims Against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company (hereafter "Farm Bureau").
The Court reviewed the respective memoranda in support and in opposition to the
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aforementioned motions and heard and considered the arguments of counsel. After being fully
advised in the matter, the Court ruled on the motions, granting the Motion to Dismiss of Farm
Bureau and denying the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The Court desires to set forth the basis of
its ruling.
It is undisputed that by statement on the letterhead of Plaintiffs counsel dated November
11, 2011, Plaintiff set forth the basis for a claim of damage caused by employee dishonesty and
theft from Plaintiffs premises totaling $121,327.29. The document was dated November 11 and
signed and notarized on November 10, 2011 by Naser Awadh.
It is undisputed that Farm Bureau issued and delivered a check for $5,000 dated
November 15, 2011 pertaining to the claim asserted from the alleged employee dishonesty and
theft.
The Court determines as a matter of law that as of November 11, 2011, Plaintiff had
knowledge of a claim for employee dishonesty and theft by an employee of Plaintiff and that
Farm Bureau had paid an amount of $5,000 pertaining to that claim on November 15, 2011. At
the time of that payment by Farm Bureau, Plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of a claim
and of an amount in dispute with Farm Bureau. On November 15, 2011, the Statute of
Limitations under Title §31-21-313(l)(a) began to run. The parties both agree that the
aforementioned statute is the statute of limitations applicable to the claims of the Plaintiff against
Farm Bureau.
In December 2011, Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant Tytis Shipmon
and did not assert any claims against Farm Bureau in said action.

2-
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The action commenced by the Plaintiff against Tytis Shipmon proceeded and was twice
scheduled on the Court's calendar for dismissal for failure to prosecute.
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a memorandum seeking to join Farm Bureau as a
party in the action. According to the reasoning of the Plaintiff in the memorandum, Plaintiff
sought to protect the interests of Farm Bureau for potential indemnification and rights against the
Defendant Tytis Shipman. The Plaintiff indicated that:
Accordingly, it should be allowed to be joined in this action to
preserve its rights against Mr. Shipman. If Farm Bureau is not
allowed to join this lawsuit, their ability to seek indemnification
against defendant may be compromised.
Plaintiff made no specific allegation against nor sought leave to bring any claim against
Farm Bureau at the time of the aforementioned memorandum. Farm Bureau was not given
notice of the request by Plaintiff to join it as a party.
On June 10, 2015 the Plaintiff and Defendant Tytis Shipman entered into an "Agreement
to Judgment and Settlement" dated June 10, 2015. The Court had set the matter for trial in July
of 20 I 5, but based upon the Agreement to Judgment and Settl_ement, the Court struck the trial
date in lieu of the judgment against Defendant Shipmon.
On August 26, 2015 Plaintiff submitted an order to the Court entitled "Order Joining
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company". The order indicated it was mailed to the registered
agent of Farm Bureau; however, Farm Bureau had not been given notice of the motion and
therefore would not have been aware of the same. The Court entered the order on August 31,
2015 and now understands procedurally that Farm Bureau had no notice of the motion pertaining
to its joinder referenced in the subject of the order.
3-
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Nevertheless, on September 23, 2015 the Plaintiff served upon Farm Bureau a Summons
with the original Complaint naming only Tytis Shipman as a defendant and making no
allegations against Farm Bureau. In response to the Complaint, counsel for Farm Bureau
inquired of the Plaintiff concerning the fact that the Complaint made no allegations against Farm
Bureau. Ultimately, Farm Bureau filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint served upon it on
September 23, 2015 by filing a Motion to Dismiss, dated December 11, 2015. In response to the
Motion to Dismiss of Farm Bureau, Plaintiff opposed the same and filed a Motion to amend its
Complaint and assert causes of action against Farm Bureau for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and allegations of "bad faith" against Farm
Bureau. Plaintiffs motion was filed January 11, 2016. The Motion to Amend of Plaintiff on
said date was the first time any legal action had been sought to be asserted against Fann Bureau.
Based upon the undisputed facts and procedural steps outlined, the Court concludes as a
matter of law that Plaintiff was required to have brought any claims and causes of action against
Farm Bureau by November 15, 2014. Based upon the fact that the first assertion of any claims
against Farm Bureau occurred January 11, 2016, any such claims are time barred by the
aforementioned statute of limitations. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss Fann Bureau is well
taken and the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied as futile - barred by the Statute of
Limitations under Title §31-21-313(l)(a). Further, even if not time barred, the Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend is not timely nor does the Court find any justification for Plaintiffs delay in waiting to
file the same until January 11, 2016. Therefore, it is:
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion to Dismiss by

4-
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Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company is granted and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend its
Complaint is denied and therefore Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of the first page***

0D

Approved as to Form:

I w1 J ~ K.

CcwtM.,vv

( wi,,H,,.,, p,e,+r~ via., er-~)

Counsel for Plaintiff

vj)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order Dismissing Claims against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company was
served by the method indicated below, to the following:
Brian Arnold

( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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Jacob K. Cowdin
ARNOLD

wADSWORTH & COGGINS

298 24th Street, Suite 230
Ogden, UT 8440 I
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Tytis Shipman
4980 South 350 East, Apt. #GI0
Ogden, UT 84405

( )
( )
(X)
( )

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mailed
E- Filed

(X)
( )
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-filed

lw' P(,L().,(, /\If. B ~
004993.00034
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IN THE 2ND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN

1

WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3

4

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO
QUICK STOP,

MOTION HEARING

5

PLAINTIFF,
6

vs.
7

TYTIS SHIPMON,

CASE
APPEAL

8
9

DEFENDANT.

110908653
20160540

JUDGE MICHAEL D. DIREDA

10
11

12
13
14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

May 4, 2016.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

16
17

ONLINE REQUEST

f 17304

18
19
20

Vj)

21

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

22

(From Electronic Recording)

23
24
25
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Gill

1
A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S

2
3

FOR PLAINTIFF:
JACOB K. COWDIN, ESQ.
ARNOLD WADSWORTH & COGGINS
298 24TH STREET #230
OGDEN UT 84401

4
5

6

FOR DEFENDANT:
7
8

9

PAUL M. BELNAP, ESQ.
STRONG & HANNI
102 SOUTH 200 EAST, #800
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

10
11

12
13
14
15
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1

(May 4, 2016)

2
THE JUDGE:

3

4

Tytis Shipmen.

Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop versus

This is case 110908653.

5

I was expecting Mr. Arnold.

6

MR. COWDIN:

7

Yes.

I'm from Mr. Arnold's office.

Jake Cowdin.

8

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

9

MR. COWDIN:

I've covered for him a few times

10

before you, Your Honor, so ...

11

THE JUDGE:

12

And counsel, will you tell me please who you are?

13

MR. BELNAP:

Paul Belnap.

14

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Belnap, I think we've met before,

15

Okay.

Thank you.

it's been a while though.

16

MR. BELNAP:

Good to see you.

17

THE JUDGE:

And I did see ...

Good to see you

18

as well.

19

want to just assume, because we often have attorneys

20

covering for each other, that it was you.

21

I did see your name on the pleadings but I didn't

I have kind of prepared an outline after having

22

reviewed the pleadings.

23

courtesy binder that I was provided with.

24

helpful.

25

Thank you.

And I appreciate very much the
It was very

Mr. Belnap, I suppose I should give you the

0003
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1

opportunity to articulate grounds for your motion in this

2

particular case, and then I'll let Mr. Cowdin respond, and

3

then I'll give you the last word on this.

4

MR. BELNAP:

5
6

7
8
9

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

ARGUMENT BY MR. BELNAP
MR. BELNAP:

If it please the court and my

colleague for the plaintiff.
This is a rather interesting procedural case and
its history.

And I've put together a few pleadings that I'd

10

like to hand to the court and counsel as I walk through very

11

briefly why I believe our motion should be granted.

12

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

13

MR. BELNAP:

I would like to start, Your Honor,

I'll let you do that.

14

with a letter from Mr. Arnold's office and a check that I

15

don't think there's any dispute about this.

16
17
18

May I approach or do you want me to hand them to
your bailiff?
THE JUDGE:

19

with you approaching.

20

MR. BELNAP:

No.

You're welcome to.

I'm okay

Thank you.
And so in November of 2011,

21

Mr. Awadh on his attorney's letterhead indicated that he

22

had sustained a theft at his business.

23

see at the top of this page it comes into Farm Bureau claims

24

and I've, I've put that in yellow at the top here.

25

THE JUDGE:

And it, as you can

I see that.

0004
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MR. BELNAP:

1

And Farm Bureau turns around

2

immediately and sends him a check for the policy limit,

3

which is the second page, of $5,000.

4

check.

That is a copy of the

5

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

6

MR. BELNAP:

Now, with that background Farm

7

Bureau receives no communication whatsoever from Mr. Awadh

8

or

9

And I'd like to just hand Your Honor what was received.

Frugal Flamingo until there was service of a process.

10

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

11

MR. BELNAP:

So in, at the end of last year,

12

September of last year Farm Bureau had served upon it, if

13

you turn to the second page, a summons that added it as a

14

listed party.

15

was the original complaint.

16

in the complaint against Farm Bureau.

And attached to that summons what was served
And there are no allegations

17

THE JUDGE:

May I ask you a question?

18

MR. BELNAP:

Please.

19

THE JUDGE:

I was curious as to why, when there

20

was a motion to join Farm Bureau to this action, that motion

21

went unopposed.

22

MR. BELNAP:

23

notification of that.
THE JUDGE:

24
25

Farm Bureau never received

Okay.

That's why it went

unopposed.

0005
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1

MR. BELNAP:

Yes, so that--

2

THE JUDGE:

You'll appreciate perhaps, maybe

3

not, that in my position often when I see motions that come

4

in

5

motion, and it goes unopposed,

6

most of my colleagues do as well, assume it's because

7

there's some agreement behind the scenes that the motion

8

can be granted and that's why there's,

9

think that it would be submitted as a stipulated motion and

and there's nothing that strikes me as odd about the
I typically, and I think

I mean, you would

10

order, but often attorneys don't do that.

11

that joinder motion.

And so I granted

12

But your position is that there was never service.

13

MR. BELNAP:

14

Not until what I just handed

Your Honor.

15

THE JUDGE:

Right.

16

MR. BELNAP:

That is the first notice that Farm

17

Bureau got of these proceedings after they had sent the

18

check that I handed you earlier.

19

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

20

MR. BELNAP:

Okay.

And so we know, Your Honor,

21

that as we look at the file the next thing I 1 m going to hand

22

you is a motion that was filed,

23

of June of 2013, and attached to it is a memorandum in

24

support of motion to join parties.

25

service on the last page went to Mr. J.D. Coreman (phonetic)

and that's got a blank date

And the certificate of
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1

who at the time was Tytis Shipman's attorney.

2

Bureau was not given any notice of this.

3

And Farm

But I think this document is extremely important

4

as a basis for why we think this matter should be

5

dismissed.

6

I've underlined in yellow your copy and counsel's as well,

7

where it indicates that an action was filed by the plaintiff

8

against Mr. Shipman in an attempt to recoup its losses.

9

And then the next part I have underlined is extremely

10

If you turn to the third page of the memorandum

important.

11

If any funds are paid out to plaintiff

12

by Farm Bureau, Farm Bureau may be

13

entitled to indemnification pending the

14

results of the immediate action.

15

Accordingly it should be allowed to be

16

joined in this action to preserve its

17

rights against Mr. Shipman.

18

If Farm Bureau is not allowed to join

19

this lawsuit their ability to seek

20

indemnification against defendant may be

21

compromised.

22

THE JUDGE:

What's interesting to me is that

23

Mr. Arnold wasn't the attorney for Farm Bureau and yet his

24

reason for wanting to join them was to protect their

25

interests.

0007
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1

MR. BELNAP:

That's what it appears.

2

THE JUDGE:

I mean, I don't fault him for

3

looking out for them.

4

to suggest to someone who wasn't familiar with the case that

5

Mr. Arnold was the attorney for Farm Bureau.

6

MR. BELNAP:

But the language would almost seem

I don't disagree, Your Honor.

7

That's why I said at the outset this is an unusual case

8

procedurally.

9

So this is what they were asking the court to join

10

my client for to protect, have its ability to protect its

11

own interests.

12

So the case, from the time this was filed in

13

January 2014 went through its second notice from this court

14

of a dismissal for no action.

15

Mr. Arnold's office on the phone and set a bench trial that

16

was supposed to take place in July of last year.

17

before that bench trial occurred there was a document filed

18

which is in essence a stipulated judgment--

Ultimately this court got

And

19

THE JUDGE:

Against Mr. Shipmen.

20

MR. BELNAP:

-- against Mr. Shipmen.

21

THE JUDGE:

I do recall this.

22

MR. BELNAP:

And based upon this document then

23

the, the court took the trial setting off its calendar and

24

proceeded as would be expected with there in essence being

25

a judgment agreed to.

0008
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So the next thing that happens after this agreed

1

2

upon judgment was entered, counsel for Frugal Flamingo

3

submits to the court an order from the motion that had been

4

filed 20 months earlier to join my client as a party.

5

Which, Your Honor, as you've already indicated, and we 1 ve

6

talked about, went ahead and signed because it was not

7

opposed.
But we were not again on any notice whatsoever

8

9

of, of this proceeding.
And so at that point the case then is captioned

10
11

in your docket system when Farm Bureau is added they are

12

added as quote "other party" end of quote, as I read the

13

docket.

14

Not a defendant, but as another party.
So my client hires me, we get a complaint that

15

doesn't even name us other than on the summons, doesn't

16

have any allegations.

17

know, the letters are attached saying we don't see anything.

18

We don't get a response so we filed a motion to dismiss.

19

I contact plaintiff's counsel, you

That then brought to play the plaintiff 1 s motion
And I, I think those two are

20

to yet again amend.

21

connected so can I speak to that?

22

THE JUDGE:

Please.

23

MR. BELNAP:

Okay.

So, Your Honor, in

24

response to our motion to dismiss my colleagues filed a

25

motion to amend their complaint and they now seek to have

0009
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1

the court allow a new complaint that alleges breach of

2

contract,

3

fair dealing, and bad faith.

4

document with what they sought permission from the court

5

and the reason they sought permission from the court to join

6

Farm Bureau as a party back in 2014, the two don't have any

7

relationship to each other in terms of the reasoning.

8
9

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
And if you compare that

That then brings to play our opposition to the
plaintiff's motion which is number one, it's futile because

10

of the statute of limitations.

11

that we've cited, Your Honor to, at title 3A-21-313(1) (a),

12

indicates,

13

Under the insurance code

An action on a written policy or

14

contract of first party insurance shall

15

be commenced within three years after the

16

inception of the loss.

17

And the motion to amend in this case was made in

18

January 2016 to bring up totally new causes of action that

19

had never been pled or mentioned before.

20

authority from our supreme court of Tucker vs. State Farm,

21

the cause of action arises when a payment has been made that

22

is allegedly not sufficient.

23
24
25

THE JUDGE:

And under the

Which would be back when this check

was tendered?
MR. BELNAP:

Exactly.
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1

THE JUDGE:

Which was November of 2011.

2

MR. BELNAP:

Correct, Your Honor.

3

THE JUDGE:

So based on 31-21-313(1) (a)

4

(phonetic), the cause of action should have, under your

5

view of this case, been filed no later than November of

6

2014.

7

MR. BELNAP:

Correct.

8

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

9

MR. BELNAP:

And the second basis for our

10

opposition to the plaintiff's motion to amend is typically

11

we find ourselves in front of Your Honor and colleagues

12

where motions to amend are quote, "freely given".

13

they're usually occurring much differently than the

14

procedure of this case.

15

But

And so our supreme court has outlined three

16

things that I think directly apply as to, in addition to

17

futility, why an amendment should not be allowed in this

18

case.

19

absolutely untimely.

20

there's already been an adjudication in that regard as to

21

the Tytis Shipman situation.

22

six years from

And

the first one is timeliness.

And it's

There's already been a judgment,

We're now approaching almost

when these events allegedly occurred.

That then peels into the second prong of

23
24

prejudice.

We absolutely believe that my client would be

25

prejudiced by this occurring so late in, in the game and in
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1
2

the situation.
And then the third prong is justification.

Is

3

there any justification that the moving party didn't have

4

knowledge of the events in time or it could bring a motion.

5

And that's quoting from the Swan Creek case that we cite on

6

page six of our opposition memorandum.

7

Your Honor.

8

It's under Tab-6,

We've said to Your Honor in that memorandum,

9

Utah courts have held that

10

justification factor focuses on whether

11

the moving party had knowledge of the

12

events that are sought to be added.

13

Well, if Mr. Awadh and his company Frugal

14

Flamingo did not think that payment was sufficient back

15

in November

16

motion to amend was made January of this year.

17

therefore, it's futile, the statute of limitations has run,

18

it's not timely, it's prejudicial, and there's no

19

justification.

of 2011, nothing was said about that until the
And,

20

And those would be our position, Your Honor.

21

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

22

MR. BELNAP:

I know that you indicated you've

23

taken the time, which we appreciate, to review this and have

24

an outline.

25

questions that you have for me?

Have I covered the points or is there any
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1

THE JUDGE:

2

I was focusing upon.

You've covered the points that

3

MR. BELNAP:

Okay.

4

THE JUDGE:

You didn't reference at all, and

5

maybe it doesn't matter because you focused on the more

6

substantive reasons for the motion to dismiss being

7

granted.

8

within a response to a motion to dismiss a counter motion

9

for leave to file an amended complaint violates Rule 7(n)

But you did offer the argument that imbedding

10

of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and I agree with you on

11

that.

12

frequently,

13

of that provision in Rule 7.

14
15
16

They are not the first to do that, I see it
I just think perhaps that attorneys are unaware

But you didn't speak to that and I don't know if
you feel like that's really a critical point here.
MR. BELNAP:

It is not, Your Honor .

. 17

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

18

MR. BELNAP:

It probably warranted a footnote

19

G,

No.

rather than an argument.

But thank you, Your Honor.

20

THE JUDGE:

You're welcome.

21

All right.

Let's see.

22

Mr. Cowdin.

ARGUMENT BY MR. COWDIN

23

MR. COWDIN:

24

I appreciate Mr. Belnap's understanding of the

25

Thank you, Your Honor.

procedural issue with the counter-motion.
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1

Your Honor, it seems as though a lot of the

2

other issues have been tabled that were briefed and we're

3

focusing primarily on the issue of the statute of

4

limitations.
THE JUDGE:

5

Well, I'm not focusing on the

6

statute right now.

7

upon is, is this issue first of all of notice and the fact

8

that Farm Bureau was not notified.

9

and his counsel was not the same thing as notifying Farm

10

I guess what I'd like to begin focusing

Bureau--

11

MR. COWDIN:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

14

Notifying Mr. Shipmen

Right.
and its counsel.

So talk to me

about the notice problem.
MR. COWDIN:

So, Your Honor, when the motion was

15

first filed it was not noticed to Farm Bureau.

16

correct on that.

You're

17

THE JUDGE:

And why is that?

18

MR. COWDIN:

I can't speak to that, Your Honor.

19

And I apologize.

20

to say that it wasn't my fault, it was my firm's mistake and

21

I guess we understand that.

It just, it wasn't done and I'm not trying

22

THE JUDGE:

Is that a problem?

23

MR. COWDIN:

Your Honor, where the motion sat for

24

as long as it did but was eventually followed up with a

25

proposed order, the proposed order before its entry was in
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1

fact served on Farm Bureau.

2

would have been a better notice procedure if they had full

3

notice of the motion, they did still at least have notice of

4

the proposed order which came with the motion.
THE JUDGE:

5

I

And although there perhaps

guess the problem is,

is that as I

6

tried to explain at the outset, the only reason that I felt

7

it appropriate to sign the order is because in my view it

8

had gone unopposed.

9

10

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

THE JUDGE:

But I didn't recognize at the time

11

that there was a problem with notice with service.

12

and I have to imagine just using my common sense that Farm

13

Bureau receives an order in the mail but has never seen a

14

motion.

And,

15

MR. COWDIN:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

16

THE JUDGE:

And maybe is confused by it, doesn't

17

understand.

18

But let's just assume for the sake of the

19

discussion that they were aware of everything that was going

20

on.

Okay?

21

MR. COWDIN:

Okay.

22

THE JUDGE:

As Mr. Belnap points out, the

23

reasoning set forth in your motion has nothing whatsoever to

24

do with ultimately the amended complaint that you filed.

25

The amended complaint seeks to recover for causes of action
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1

that actually run against Farm Bureau.

2

motion to join them you speak to wanting to join them to

3

protect their interest, the indemnification interest that

4

they may have.

5

hey, we just want to bring them in so their interest is

6

protected.

7

join them you then allege breach of contract, breach of the

8

covenant of--

And to me that seems misleading.

It's like

And then when you file the amended complaint to

MR. COWDIN:

9

And yet in your

Sure.

10

THE JUDGE:

11

And I guess that causes the notice issue to be

12

good faith and fair dealing.

even more critical.

13

If you were really just bringing them in to

14

protect their interest, then I would be less concerned about

15

the notice to Farm Bureau because I would say all they are

16

trying to do here is just make sure that Farm Bureau's

17

interests are protected.

18

bait and switch of sorts.

But it's almost like kind of like a

19

MR. COWDIN:

Sure.

20

THE JUDGE:

Here, Judge, here's the reason, it's

21

really very innocent and noble of us.

22

the underlying reason for bringing them in is to go after

23

them.

24

25

But all the while

Yes?
MR. COWDIN:

Well, and yes, I'll have to speak to

that, Your Honor.
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1

So I guess a part of the confusion in the issue

2

there is the delay between the timing of the motion and the

3

timing of the order.

4

appropriate thing would have been to amend the motion in

5

some manner to more accurately reflect the basis for the

6

order that was submitted.

7

And perhaps the more fully

You have to understand the issue is, is when we

8

first started the case there was some concern about Farm

9

Bureau reimbursing Frugal Flamingo for stolen cash.

It

10

didn't include all of the stolen merchandise and the

11

entirety of the complaint that we first filed against

12

Tytis Shipmen.

13

After the case begins proceeding against

14

Mr. Shipman we made some progress about the stealing of

15

merchandise and different things like that.

16

sit stale on two different occasions.

17

The case does

And then upon being set for trial Mr. Arnold

18

contacts Mr. Shipman and they subsequently work out the

19

agreement that the court has and that Mr. Belnap presented.

20

That seemed to change the scope of things

a

21

little bit, Your Honor, because then we, at that point we

22

had an admission that the merchandise was stolen.

23

point it's absolutely clear that the policy should have been

24

triggered, whereas before it was merely a suspicion.

25

At that

And with the judgment that was agreed to we now
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have a fair claim to damages.

2

that Mr. Shipmen is unable to cover those damages.

3

received about $10,000 to date despite the judgment being

4

for more than $200,000.

5

But the problem we have is
We only

Now, I understand that Mr. Shipmon can't agree to

6

a judgment on behalf of Farm Bureau, obviously they are

7

entitled to dispute that.

8

the motion was filed we did not have a judgment yet, and

9

Farm Bureau had a right to indemnification if Mr. Shipmon

10

But the issue is, is before when

did in fact pay some funds.

11

However, after that stipulation is filed or

12

entered we then have an issue where the judgment cannot be

13

met by Mr. Shipmen, and the policy for Farm Bureau should

14

then kick in to cover.

15

And the motion, Your Honor, it does allude in

16

that single paragraph to almost a good faith effort to

17

allow

18

the same breath does discuss a general joinder and it does

19

discuss that plaintiff holds an insurance, holds a policy

20

insuring

21

Bureau.

22

Farm Bureau to be indemnified.

But it also in

it against loss and the policy was issued by Farm

So I don't think that while it's, it does have

23

that paragraph including a discussion of indemnification,

24

I don't think it's a long shot that you could also say,

25

Your Honor, that it could be perhaps known to Farm Bureau
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that they may have to pay assuming Tytis Shipman is not

2

able to satisfy a judgment for the merchandise he stole.
THE JUDGE:

3

4

say that Farm Bureau paid like immediately and they

5

tendered their policy limit.
MR. COWDIN:

6

~

Except I understood Mr. Belnap to

The problem with that, Your Honor,

7

is they tried to tender the policy limit under facts that

8

weren't complete.

9

from Frugal Flamingo, and they issued just the $5,000, it

There was some cash that was stolen

10

was a very low payment considering what was stolen.

11

Your Honor, the current judgment and agreement on the record

12

is for more than $200,000.
THE JUDGE:

13

14

No,

I understand that.

Again

But help me

to, because obviously I'm confused on this.

15

MR. COWDIN:

Yes.

16

THE JUDGE:

I mean, each insurance policy has a

18

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

19

THE JUDGE:

And as an insured individual the

17

20

limit.

limit is often based on the premiums you're paying.

21

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

22

THE JUDGE:

If you want a larger limit you pay

And we all make those decisions when we get

23

more.

24

automobile insurance and other types of insurance.

25

So what I'm trying to understand in this case is
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1

when Mr. Belnap says $5,000 was the policy limit, help me to

2

understand was it or was it not the policy limit?

MR. COWDIN:

3

It wasn't the policy limit.

And I

4

apologize, Your Honor,

5

me.

6

other minor provisions related to,

7

what it was,

8

terms sort of like an umbrella coverage that would allow for

9

more, especially I think if it was done in bad faith or

10

But that, that was specific to,

just the theft.

I'm trying to recall,

I can't remember exactly

But there were additional

intentional loss.

11
12

I don't have the policy in front of

So at the time then that they

THE JUDGE:

tendered the check to your client--

13

MR. COWDIN:

14

THE JUDGE:

Yes.
does he call them?

Does he

15

raise this issue with them?

16

you've given me is,

17

in terms of covering my losses and, or does he just send

18

the check back and say hold off until I finish figuring out

19

how much my loss is and then we'll revisit this discussion

20

of what I feel I'm owed by you folks?

21

I'm--

I'm not accepting this, this is adequate

22

MR. COWDIN:

23

THE JUDGE:

24

takes the check.

25

inadequate.

Does he say this amount that

I mean,

I guess

Sure.
troubled by the fact that he

No mention is made that the check is

No mention is made to the insurance company

0020

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0385

1

that they have acted somehow in bad faith,--

2

MR. COWDIN:

3

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative) .
that they have breached their

4

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that they have

5

breached their contract.

6

insurance company's attention.

7

None of that is brought to the

And so the case just kind of proceeds along.

8

Farm Bureau is of the opinion that they have tendered a

9

fair amount to your client.

And then Mr. Shipman and

10

Mr. Arnold enter into an agreement, a judgment is entered

11

pursuant to that agreement,

12

Farm Bureau tendered.

13

MR. COWDIN:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

14

THE JUDGE:

But again, Farm Bureau is still,

it's well above the amount that

15

you know,

just kind of strolling down the path thinking they

16

have done their job, there's no issue.

17

there's

18

here.

19

communication with them during this time.

There,

I mean,

no indication that they are aware of total loss
Because as I understand it there's been no
Is that correct?

MR. COWDIN:

Your Honor,

22

THE JUDGE:

Oh.

23

MR. COWDIN:

I think that their, after the check

20
21

I think that's

incorrect.

24

was issued, and I'd ask for the court's indulgence real

25

quick to double-check with my client to make sure I'm not
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1

misrepresenting this.

2

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

3

MR. COWDIN:

But I believe there are emails, and

4

that discuss that very issue.

5

client real quick.

If I could just check with my

6

THE JUDGE:

Yes, absolutely.

7

MR. COWDIN:

Your Honor, so as I was saying, it's

8

9

true, there were emails.
And there was also the prior attorney, her name

10

was Jessica, at the firm was in communication with the

11

insurance adjuster.

12

the $5,000 limit was for each incident.

Mr. Awadh, also clarified, Your Honor,
And so this was--

13

THE JUDGE:

Each incident of theft?

14

MR. COWDIN:

Of theft.

15

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

16

MR. COWDIN:

Yes.

And again there's also an

17

umbrella coverage in there I believe as well.

18

incidents occurred over about a two year period, so it

19

totalled up rather quickly.

20

And so the

So but to get back to your question, Your Honor,

21

as to what happened after the $5,000 check was issued.

22

There are emails that my client and also a prior attorney

23

for our law firm was in communication with Farm Bureau.

24
25

THE JUDGE:

And can you give me a sense for what

the nature of that communication was with Farm Bureau?
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MR. COWDIN:

Just that the $5,000, Farm Bureau's

2

position was that there was only one incident of theft and

3

that's all they had to pay.

4

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

5

MR. COWDIN:

Or that all of these collective

6

thefts were just one total incident.

7

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

8

MR. COWDIN:

Whereas we disagree with that for

9

obvious reasons.

10
11

THE JUDGE:

And so those communications occurred

at or near the issuance of the check?

12

MR. COWDIN:

Or, yes, or immediately afterwards.

13

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

14

MR. COWDIN:

And so when a part of it--

15

THE JUDGE:

So that's, so just to be clear--

16

MR. COWDIN:

Yes.

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MR. COWDIN:

Yes.

19

THE JUDGE:

Now, when Mr. Belnap says under the

So what--

that's November of 2011.

20

Tucker decision that the cause of action arises when payment

21

is made and there's recognition or there's the belief that

22

the payment is inadequate that there's been a breach of, of

23

this covenant or breach of this contract, do you agree with

24

that?

25

MR. COWDIN:

I recognize that law, Your Honor.
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1

But our counter argument to that law would be that this is

2

an ongoing case that we have against Tytis Shipmen trying

3

to ascertain the full scope of the thefts, everything that

4

was taken and everything in that manner.

5

And there is substantial case law, Your Honor,

6

that I think would contradict or counter that.

And those

7

cases discuss when a party has actual or constructive

8

knowledge of the facts that give, give a cause of action

9

merit.

And I would say, Your Honor, that until we get a

10

signed stipulation from Tytis Shipmen that at a minimum

11

that, that date would be when we have actual or

12

constructive knowledge of the thefts.

13

full

14

I mean, there's a

blown admission.
THE JUDGE:

Well, you would have knowledge of the

15

total loss certainly.

16

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

17

THE JUDGE:

But the knowledge we're talking

18

about isn't knowledge of total loss, it's knowledge of the

19

fact that the insurance company is unwilling to pay any

20

more than what they have tendered.

21

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

22

THE JUDGE:

Now whether you knew it was 200,000

23

or whether you knew it was 500,000--

24

MR. COWDIN:

25

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh {affirmative).
or 10,000, whatever the case, at
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1

the end of the day it seems clear to me that the

2

communication was $5,000 is not adequate.

3

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

4

THE JUDGE:

But yet the insurance company was

5

insisting that it was, hence the impasse.

6

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

7

THE JUDGE:

And in my view perhaps, and I know

8

you don't share this view, but it would seem to me that that

9

would be the moment in time when the clock would begin to

10

tick when we would say that's when the cause of action

11

arises.

12

appreciated at that point you do believe that it's well

13

above the 5,000 that's been tendered.

14

position.

15

does not begin to tick until the judgment is entered against

16

Mr. Shipman.

Because even though the full scope of damage isn't

So I don't know why in your view the, the clock

MR. COWDIN:

17

You've taken that

Well, and I think the answer to

18

that, Your Honor,

19

Farm Bureau tried to pay, pay on, and the, the policy

20

requirements and what Farm Bureau should have owed was not

21

necessarily ascertained entirely at that time, and that

22

took further litigation.

23

that Farm Bureau is trying to rely on in saying this is

24

when this check was cut, this is when the clock should

25

start.

is again there's the one incident that

You have this isolated episode
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And I guess I disagree with that, Your Honor,

2

because the, the scope of this case is far greater than

3

that.

4

And the case law, Your Honor, and I can cite the

5

cases, basically says that again you need actual or

6

constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to the

7

claim.

8

is going to in fact be, and that's the issue.

Well, we don't know what the entirety of the claim

And more so than that, Your Honor, those type of

9

10

evaluations are fact intensive.

11

limitations is a question of law and how that applies, the

12

issue of the underlying facts is a question of fact which we

13

have not gone into discovery.

14

summary judgment.

15

flushed out in more depth.

16

Although the statute of

This is not a motion for

Those type of things would need to be

And I mean, Your Honor, that would also include

17

the emails around the time and the

18

that payment, that $5,000 payment, what was said, what was

19

promised.

20

agents told him he could file his claim against Farm Bureau

21

at any moment in time.

22

that's true or not.

23

context of

following

My client believes that there was, when the

I don't know, you know, whether
Again, we don't have those emails.

THE JUDGE:

Well it's not, it's not critical to

24

my determination today.

I guess what I'm, what I'm

25

focusing on is, is whether or not Farm Bureau, whether or
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not you representing your client knew the full scope and

2

scale of damage.

3

At the time the $5,000 check was tendered,

in

4

Farm Bureau's mind, in Farm Bureau's mind as full and

5

complete settlement on this matter because they believed

6

there was one incident of theft and this was a policy limit

7

settlement of sorts.

8

of whether you know the full scope and scale of damage, if

9

they weren't paying you a dollar more than what they said

10

At that moment in time, regardless

they owed, that's a breach of contract.

11

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

12

THE JUDGE:

That's a breach of the covenant of

13

good faith and fair dealing, whether it's, whether it's

14

$10,000, whether it's $10,000 damage, whether it's $5,200

15

damage, whatever the case.

16

believe that they owed more than what they tendered you have

17

your cause of action at that point.

What I'm saying is if you

18

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

19

THE JUDGE:

And discovery would flush out

20

exactly to what degree they were breaching their contract

21

or breaching their covenant.

22

you didn't appreciate there was a breach until you knew the

23

full scale of the damages Mr. Shipmen was going to concede,

24

I don't follow that logic.

25

the full scale.

But to suggest to me that

I understand you didn't know

But you're suggesting that you didn't know
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there was a breach until then.

2

case.

3

the $5,000 check.

4

and forth.

5

no, there's, it's 5,000 policy limit per theft.

6

saying no, it's all one episode.

7

debate was occurring.

8

MR. COWDIN:

9

THE JUDGE:

10

And that's clearly not the

You knew there was a breach back when they tendered
That's why the emails were going back

That's why there was a statement made no, no,
And they're

I mean, that's when this

Right?
Right.
In my mind that's when the cause of

action accrues.
MR. COWDIN:

11

Sure.

And at that time the case

12

was filed, Your Honor, we have a case ongoing against

13

Mr. Shipman where we're trying to nail that down.

14

And I suppose what the court is saying, and I

15

don't mean to speak for Your Honor, but that we should have

16

filed the case against both Tytis Shipmon and Farm Bureau.

17

And the issue with that is you have this complete check, or

18

you have this check that Farm Bureau believes is complete,

19

and although it was disputed, there's was questions and

20

things like that, we don't have actual or full constructive

21

knowledge.

22

And whether that amounts to a determination of the

23

damages or whether Farm Bureau has any liability based on

24

the actions of Mr. Shipmen, our position is that that

25

couldn't have been ascertained absent either discovery of
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Mr. Shipmen himself or a stipulation which ended up

2

happening in this case and so--

3

THE JUDGE:

Well, the stipulation is entered.

4

MR. COWDIN:

Yes.

And we did move quick, and,

5

and that position I believe is supported, Your Honor,

6

because we did move rather quickly after the stipulation is

7

done.
THE JUDGE:

8

9

This is my other problem is that

from the time the $5,000 check is tendered by Farm Bureau a

10

stipulation with Mr. Shipmen is not arrived at until June

11

of 2015.

12

going on during this period of time?

13

notices of intent to dismiss during that time?

I mean, almost four years later.

So what is

Weren't there some

14

MR. COWDIN:

There were.

15

THE JUDGE:

So the case is just sitting.

16

MR. COWDIN:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

17

THE JUDGE:

I mean, it's not being actively

18

worked, because if it had been my clerks wouldn't have been

19

sending out notices of intent to dismiss.

20

MR. COWDIN:

Right.

21

THE JUDGE:

So again we have a situation where

22

even if I assume for the sake of our discussion that the

23

cause of action didn't accrue on the date the check was

24

tendered or on or about that date when the emails were

25

going back and forth,

are you telling me that a year later
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the cause of action shouldn't have accrued, that there

2

wasn't actual or constructive notice, two years later.

3

mean, you know what I'm saying?

4

MR. COWDIN:

Yes, I understand.

5

THE JUDGE:

It seems to me to be extremely

I

6

unreasonable to say we didn't know that there was a cause

7

of action against Farm Bureau until four years after they

8

tendered their check.

9

MR. COWDIN:

And there could, of course, have

10

been

11

know, discovery, whether it be deposition or getting to

12

trial.

13

manner.

14

more efforts to get Tytis Shipmen to comply with, you

And those things could have been done in a faster

I don't know if that necessarily ruins the

15

argument though.

16

suggests that's there has to be, and maybe I should just

17

cite it, but let's see,

18

I think that the, the, or the case law

At what point a party should have

19

reasonably discovered its claim is a fact

20

intensive inquiry.

21

And that, let's see.

It's reasonable efforts,

22

Your Honor, so that--

23

MR. BELNAP:

What is that case, counsel?

24

MR. COWDIN:

I believe that is in, let's see, so

25

I'm looking at two cases.

One is Snow v. Rudd.

I can give
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1

you the citation if you need it.

2

Shiozawa v. Duke.

3

appellate court cases, supreme court cases.

4

The other one is

And they, of course, cite other cases,

So Your Honor, I quess, I guess the question that

5

you're asking is what reasonable efforts were made during

6

this time to, again assuming arguendo that we had made

7

reasonable efforts to discover this information.
And Your Honor, the record is absent notices as

8
9

far as different things, you know, depositions, mediation,

10

different things like that.

11

show that there was attempted notice of deposition and that

12

was prepared prior to trial.

13

scheduled and then, of course, after that you have the

14

stipulation.

15

concession there, Your Honor, that more effort could have

16

been made.

17

However, in our file we do

Trial was subsequently

So some effort was made.

Again, a

Ultimately though when we have all of the

18

information, all of the facts, the underlying issues to

19

this case that give us the ability to pursue Farm Bureau for

20

what is now reimbursement of a judgment as opposed to

21

indemnification, that the rules and the liberal pleading

22

procedural rules should allow us to now amend the complaint

23

and proceed with our case against Farm Bureau.

24
25

THE JUDGE:

I'm so, I'm so troubled by the

procedural history in this case.

I mean, I don't think
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1

it's an overstatement to say this case is a mess.

2

MR. COWDIN:

Sure.

3

THE JUDGE:

Because even after four years down

4

the road when you, when you filed the motion, you don't

5

initially say we're filing the motion to join Farm Bureau

6

because we believe they have breached their contract with

7

us.

8

to protect their indemnification rights.

9

troubling.

The statement in the motion is we want them to, we want

10

And that to me is

The second layer that is troubling is the fact

11

that they weren't given notice of the motion in the first

12

place.

13

but we sent them the order.

14

motion.

15

oh,

16

probably not going to oppose that.

17

issue in the motion that you wanted to bring them in

18

because you felt they had breached their agreement I have

19

no doubt they would have filed a memorandum in opposition

20

to that motion for joinder.

Now, you've tried to save yourself by saying well,
But you didn't send them the

And even if you had they probably would have said

okay, well they're just trying to protect us, we're
If you had raised the

21

MR. COWDIN:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

22

THE JUDGE:

And I would have conducted a hearing

23

and heard argument.

Instead I grant the request because it

24

goes unopposed, the reason it goes unopposed is because there

25

is no notice.
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1

But then here is the other part that troubles me.

2

After you get your order joining them you don't file an

3

amended complaint to allege the causes of action that

4

pertain to Farm Bureau.

5

filed remains and there is nothing in that complaint that

6

says anything about Farm Bureau.

7

don't do anything until Mr. Belnap brings his motion to

8

dismiss

9

complaint

The complaint that you originally

Right.

And so you

and says now wait a second, we've looked at the
and there's absolutely no mention in it of Farm

10

Bureau at all, so why are we being joined here, this

11

doesn't even

12

that then you

13

causes of

14

make sense.

And it's only at that point

seek to amend the complaint to allege these

action that pertain to the insurance company.
I mean, I'm just so troubled by the, it just seems,
And I don't

15

there's such a disconnect all the way through.

16

know, and I'm certainly not pointing a finger at you.

17

I'm just wondering if you can offer me any sort of insight or

18

explanation that will cause me to look at this differently.

19

Because right now as I look at it I think this is a mess,

20

from the get go it's a mess.

21

MR. COWDIN:

But

So, Your Honor, I guess the first

22

issue on the motion to join the parties yes, again there

23

is that particular paragraph that discusses the good faith

24

purpose of joining Farm Bureau.

25

other terms in that motion that discuss Farm Bureau being

Again, I believe there's
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1

aware that they are the policy insured and that a-THE JUDGE:

2

Okay.

But show me where there's

3

mention in your motion that Farm Bureau has liability,

4

that the reason you're bringing, you're seeking to join

5

them is because you believe they have breached their contract

6

with your client.

Show me where other than referencing

7

them as the insurance carrier.

8

MR. COWDIN:

9

Sure.

Well, and it doesn't

verbatim say, Your Honor, that we're absolutely pursuing a

10

bunch of damages against Farm Bureau.

11

third paragraph of the argument section of the motion.

But this is in the

THE JUDGE:

Starting with, in the instant

14

MR. COWDIN:

In the instant matter, yes.

15

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

16

MR. COWDIN:

Plaintiff holds a policy

17

insuring it against loss.

18

issued by Farm Bureau.

19

defendant's action plaintiff has incurred

20

losses of at least ...

21

And it gives a figure.

22

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

23

MR. COWDIN:

Without a doubt plaintiff

24

is entitled to some compensation for its

25

loss but is admittedly not entitled to

12
13

matter?

The policy was
As a result of
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~

1

double dip.

2

This is a little bit later in that same

3

4

paragraph.
And so, and it goes on,

5

As it was defendant's intentional acts

6

which caused plaintiff's damages he's

7

ultimately responsible for the losses

8

that incurred.

9

It goes on then, Your Honor, to assume that

~

10

Mr. Shipmen is capable of paying these funds.

11

it's fair to say that based on those terms--

12
13
14

THE JUDGE:
after that.

But I think

But you left out the paragraph right

You just stop.

MR. COWDIN:

No,

I said, yes if the remainder of

15

that goes on to say that it's assuming Mr. Shipmen can pay

16

the funds and that Farm Bureau would be entitled to

17

indemnification.

18

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

19

MR. COWDIN:

But the--

20

THE JUDGE:

So I'm,

21

22

I'm still not seeing any

language in here that puts Farm Bureau on notice.

MR. COWDIN:

I think the preceding language

23

there, Your Honor, puts Farm Bureau on, well, it obviously

24

states that they are insured, and it references the

25

double-dipping.

But says that basically defendant Tytis
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1

Shipmon is ultimately responsible for those losses.

2

that if you consider the fact Farm Bureau woul~ know that

3

they have the policy, and that if Mr. Shipman is unable to

4

pay that they would be on the hook for the damages caused by

5

Mr. Shipmen's actions.

6

I think

Although admittedly, Your Honor, it doesn't

7

specifically say that in the motion the part that I just

8

said.

9

But it's something rather than nothing, I suppose.
The other parts, Your Honor, I think you were

10

concerned about, the procedural history following, so the

11

order is entered joining Farm Bureau in August of 2015.

12

There were a few letters sent by, the two letters sent by

13

counsel for Farm Bureau to our office.

14

period we're deciding and attempting to basically nail down

15

exactly what causes of action to submit.

16

And during that

And again, Your Honor, this is one other issue
But as opposed to the case

17

that could have been quicker.

18

taking years to get it to that point that is a matter

19

of months that we have prepared an amendment and are

20

preparing to move forward on your case now against Farm

21

Bureau with the causes of actions properly listed.

22

again, the facts, underlying facts of the case have not

23

changed one bit.

24

25

THE JUDGE:

And

See, you indicated to me that you

didn't, you didn't appreciate the, that the value of what
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1

was stolen was significant.

2

correspondence would seem to suggest otherwise.

3

the letter, it's on your letterhead and a, it's actually

4

your client, Nassir Awadh.

5

is a seven paragraphs that outline it, and five says,

6

But this November 11th

And then there

The total value of items and money

7

stolen from the store totals

8

approximately $121,327.29.

9

Now let me just--

10
11
12

This is

MR. COWDIN:

And the judgment is for a far

greater amount.

THE JUDGE:

Yes, 233,421.14.

I agree with you.

13

But if we're talking about whether or not $5,000 was, was in

14

the ballpark and you didn't really know, it was, it was

15

understood at the time that the check was written.

16

this was faxed over to Farm Bureau probably, I mean, I

17

haven't looked to see when the check was, the time the

18

check arrived to know whether the check arrived or whether

19

the letter arrived first.

20

I'm not totally clear on that.

But suffice it to say the check arrived

21

November 15, 2011.

22

and was faxed over at 2:56 p.m ..

23

In fact,

This letter was generated the same day

Now what am I to infer from that?

Farm Bureau

24

gives a check for 5,000 and then a letter comes from your

25

law office that says hey wait a second, the total value of
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1

the items and money stolen totals approximately $121,000,

2

as of now I have incurred 5,000 in attorney's fees, this

3

amount will increase if further action is needed.

4

Tell me how I, do you know the timing?

5

MR. COWDIN:

I don't.

I don't know the timing

6

on that, Your Honor.

7

before it was, although at that time there was this

8

suspicion that damages may have been as much as $121,000

9

obviously it could have even been far greater than

10

And I think it,

just as we stated

what the

judgment ended up being.
I recognize the point from the court is that it's,

11

12

the difference between the $5,000 payment and the, the

13

$121,000 believed to be incurred at that time is

14

significant.

15

Just again to reiterate, Your Honor, the extent

16

and the, the thefts that were done wasn't known at that time

17

and it could have been far far greater than even the

18

$121,000.

19

And so perhaps Mr. Awadh should have, or the

20

plaintiff Frugal Flamingo should have filed the complaint

21

against Farm Bureau at that time.

22

more work to be done on that case to ascertain all of that

23

information.

24
25

THE JUDGE:

However, there was a lot

Do you agree the statute of

limitations is a three year statute?

Are we on the same
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1

page?
MR. COWDIN:

2
3

4

I recognize the statute, Your Honor,

yes.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

I

5

that that part isn't in dispute.

6

31-21-313 (1) (a)?

just want to make sure that
You acknowledge

7

MR. COWDIN:

Relating to insurance contracts.

8

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

9

MR. COWDIN:

Correct, Your Honor.

10

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

11

And, and assuming again for the sake of

~

Fine.

12

discussion that November 2011 is the date that I find the

13

cause of action accrued, began, you would concede that the

14

amended complaint is outside of that statute of

15

limitations?

16

MR. COWDIN:

November 2014.

17

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

Correct, Your Honor.

What about, let's finally

18

talk about just for a moment this question of leave to

19

amend and the timeliness or untimeliness of that.

20

Mr. Belnap talked about, you know, it's untimely,

21

prejudicial.

22

to me about that.

23

it's

And there's no justification for it.

MR. COWDIN:

Well,

Speak

I think the timeliness issue,

24

Your Honor, we've, we've discussed kind of adnauseum.

25

It's as timely as Frugal Flamingo could have, or perhaps
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1

they could have done a little better, but has brought it.

2

The issue now, Your Honor, having the stipulation

3

with Mr. Shipmen done knowing that he's admitted to the

4

theft, which I think clearly triggers different provisions

5

of the policy, should allow for Mr. Awadh to move forward

6

and Frugal Flamingo to move forward with their claims

7

against Farm Bureau.

The, the language as far as amending a complaint

8

9

I think that that is justified.

10

amendment in this case even despite the lengthiness of the

11

procedural history of this case.

12

There are different rights that my client needs

13

to assert.

14

theft.

15

Mr. Shipmen is not able to pay, my client is out hundreds

16

of thousands of dollars on money he should be entitled to.

17

He paid--

18

He's entitled to damages for Mr. Shipmen's

And if the amendment is not allowed, Your Honor,

THE JUDGE:

I'm not suggesting to you for a

19

minute that your client isn't entitled to be put back to

20

square one where he was before--

21

MR. COWDIN:

22

THE JUDGE:

23

24
25

~

I think is very liberal, Your Honor, and it supports

Okay.
all of this occurred.

But the

ends don't justify the means.
I mean, I recognize, and my decision today is not
a commentary on whether or not I think your client is
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1

entitled to be reimbursed.

2

MR. COWDIN:

I understand.

3

THE JUDGE:

It's a commentary on not following

4

the rules, not filing things when they are required to be

5

filed under the timeliness requirements, under the statute

6

of limitations.

7

timely in manner we don't just turn a blind eye to the

8

law

9

that

And if,

if actions are not filed in a

in order to help somebody recover, because if we do
then the law ceases to have meaning.

10

there's a

11

limitations.

12

I mean,

reason why we have a three years statute of

And really for me the only question becomes did

13

you comply with it or not.

14

not,

15

client unable to recoup, but that's not my fault.

16

the

17

file

I know that's unfair,

If I conclude that you did
I know that that rendered your
That's

fault of the attorneys representing him who failed to

18

in a timely manner.

That's the way I look at it.

And you're kind of making sort of an equity

19

argument to me, you're saying look he's entitled to be made

20

whole.

21

wrong.

I don't dispute that.

MR. COWDIN:

22
23

portion of,

24

court.

25

I mean, he didn't do anything

I was referring to the justification

I believe that was one of the questions of the

THE JUDGE:

Well,

I thought the justification was
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~

1

the justification for delay.
MR. COWDIN:

2

Well and it talks, and I felt that

3

was covered in the timeliness prong as far as the delay goes

4

but perhaps I wasn't correct, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

5

6

Okay.

What else?

Anything else

that you'd like to speak to?

MR. COWDIN:

7

Your Honor,

just that again there

8

was the motion to join which was done in 2014, prior to

9

that three year statute expiring even if the date starts
I've recognize that that was not served

10

on November 2011.

11

on Frugal Flamingo, or I'm sorry, on Farm Bureau.

12

with that motion lodged it's obviously intended that Farm

13

Bureau would be joined to the case.

14

More so than that, Your Honor, the case,

However,

I feel

15

should start toll, or counting as far as the statute of

16

limitation goes from the time that Tytis Shipmen signed the

17

agreement as that solidifies and gives us actual and

18

constructive knowledge of the facts that would lead us to

19

the causes of action that we have listed in the amended

20

complaint.

21

THE JUDGE:

No one has asked me to do this but I

22

guess I'm wondering,

and this hasn't been briefed but may I

23

just ask you this question?

24

MR. COWDIN:

Sure.

25

THE JUDGE:

Is there a reason why I shouldn't
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1

vacate the order that allowed for joinder, because there

2

wasn't notice given on the underlying motion?
MR. COWDIN:

3

4

I suppose you could do that

Your Honor and--

THE JUDGE:

5

Would that not be the appropriate

6

thing to do because it was an order granted under the

7

mistaken belief that notice had been provided and no

8

opposition had been filed?
MR. COWDIN:

9

And if I could just real quick,

10

Your Honor,

11

court.

12

is we also served a copy of the motion.

13

proof of that but I did, it was me personally that placed

14

the order in the mail and I do believe I put the motion in

15

there as well.

16

I don't want to represent anything to the

But my understanding of when we served the order
Now,

I don't have

However, admittedly, Your Honor, that would have

17

only given Farm Bureau a week's notice as opposed to two

18

weeks.

19

vacating that order goes.

20

not pled, we haven't responded to that if I understand.

21
22

And so that, that could be an issue as far as

THE JUDGE:

I recognize that.

I don't think I have any

Okay.

other questions.

23

MR. COWDIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

24

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Belnap?

25

But that was

*
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1
2

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. BELNAP
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, I don't think I have

I think the court understands the facts.

3

anything to add.

4

If you have any questions for me or concerns.

5

THE JUDGE:

Well, you didn't ask at all for me

6

to consider vacating that original order joining Farm

7

Bureau, and I kind of raised it at the end and wondered

8

what your thoughts are on that issue.

Does that really

9

change anything if I were to do that?

I mean, would that

10

not just basically put them back in the posture of well,

11

we'll just file a motion to join and we'll go through all

12

of that hoop jumping and it won't really change anything,

13

you'll will be back to deciding whether to allow leave to

14

amend and, and a,--

15

MR. BELNAP:

16

Your Honor's question this way.

17

any way to impugn my colleague's indication.

18

served, I did not bring a copy, but what was served on my

19

client was exactly what I handed--

Your Honor, I would answer
I don't any intend in

20

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

21

MR. BELNAP:

-- to the court.

But what was

And this order

22

does say that it was mailed on August 26th and the order

23

was entered on the 31st.

So that's five days, Your Honor,

24

unless my math is wrong.

And under the rules you get

25

three days for mailing.

That means by the time this hit
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1

CT Corporation Systems it was the 29th of August and the

2

order is entered on the 31st.

3

served, the summons and the original complaint, which you

4

already indicated doesn't name Farm Bureau.

5

think this order joining Farm Bureau should have been

6

entered.

THE JUDGE:

7

8

And thereafter this is

So I don't

It shouldn't have been.

I concede

that.

9

MR. BELNAP:

But I go back to the bottom line

10

is what were they asking.

11

had lot of discussion about that.

You've already indicated we've

12

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

13

MR. BELNAP:

And that is just to join them so

14

that they could protect Farm Bureau's interests.

Now

15

we're off to the races in a totally different direction as

16

of January of this year.

17

limitations.

Completely past the statute of

I think that's the issue, Your Honor.

COURT'S ORDER

18

THE JUDGE:

19

I am going to, I'm going to find,

20

among other things, that the cause of action in this

21

particular case against Farm Bureau commenced in November

22

of 2011.

23

thereafter the check was tendered and there was recognition

24

that that check was, my words, not anyone else's, woefully

25

inadequate in terms of what was perceived to be the damage

If not at the moment certainly shortly

0045

45
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0410

And I again recognize that the damage

1

at that time.

2

wasn't fully appreciated, I make that finding, because

3

there was still an ongoing investigation against

4

Mr. Shipmen.

5

been entered.

And the, and the stipulated judgment had not

But in the letter sent by Arnold and Wadsworth

6
7

attorneys dated November 11, 2011, the same day the check

8

was tendered, it is clear that Mr. Awadh believed according

9

to this sworn statement I guess we would call it, it's

10

notarized, it doesn't really tell me if this is a

11

declaration or what it is, it's not really in affidavit

12

form.

But in any event paragraph five says,

13

The total value of items and money

14

stolen from the store totals

15

approximately $121,327.29.

16

That statement in the court's view is critical

17

because it reflected that there was a belief at that time

18

that the damages far exceeded 5,000.

19

conceded by the parties that emails were exchanged that

20

reflected that Mr. Awadh believed that he was entitled·to

21

more compensation for his losses.

22

today that, that under the policy it was believed that it

23

was $5,000 per incident.

24

policy limit.

25

referenced.

And, and it's also

I think it was mentioned

That was the cap.

That was the

Plus umbrella coverage I think that you
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1

And accordingly, there were discussions made,

2

the court would find, wherein it was expressed to Farm

3

Bureau that the $5,000 check that was tendered was not

4

adequate to cover the losses in this case.

5

those losses may not have been fully appreciated at that

6

time,

7

November of 2011.

it is

And while

clear that a dispute arose on or about

Accordingly, the court applying the statute of

8
9

limitations that is contained within 31-21-313(1) {a), three

10

year statute of limitations, finds that the motion to amend

11

and the corresponding amended complaint needed to be filed

12

by November of 2014.

13

In my view Tucker establishes the cause of action

14

accrual date.

15

amended complaint needed to be filed.

16

undisputed that the motion to amend in this case was not

17

filed until January 2016, well beyond the three year statute

18

of limitations.

19

The statute establishes the date by which the

I would add to the findings that I have made that

20

with respect to this motion to amend ...

21

up.

22
23
24
25

And I think it is

Well,

let me back

With respect to the motion to join Farm Bureau
that was, help me with the date on that.
MR. BELNAP:
itself is not dated.

The date on that is, the motion
It just says blank day of June 2013.
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1

But the memo attached is dated January 27, 2014.
MR. COWDIN:

2
3

Which is when it was filed

Your Honor, January 2014.
THE JUDGE:

4

So the motion to join parties that

5

was filed, and I'll accept the date that is referenced on

6

the memorandum which is January 2000, January 26, 2014, the

7

court would find that this motion was not served on Farm

8

Bureau.
The court would further find that the contents of

9

10

the motion referenced joining Farm Bureau for the purpose of

11

protecting its interests, its right to reimbursement or

12

rather indemnification, and that's the extent of what this

13

motion references.

14

section of this motion to Frugal Flamingo's intent to join

15

Farm Bureau for the purpose of pursuing an action against

16

them.

17

There is no reference in the argument

And that's critical in the court's view.

18

Because when the summons and complaint is ultimately, and

19

order

20

did not appreciate there was a service problem, the court

21

simply believed and perceived that it was an unopposed

22

motion.

23

Bureau, Farm Bureau was served with the original complaint

24

which doesn't name it in the complaint and has no

25

allegations within the complaint that referenced Farm

that the court signed unwittingly because the court

When the documents were ultimately served on Farm

0048
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1

Bureau.

2

It was also served, let's see, was served with

3

the original complaint and the order joining them I

4

believe.
Was there something served?

5

6

Did I get that right?

I'm sorry that I'm all--

7

MR. BELNAP:

That is correct, Your Honor.

8

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

9

order,

joining, complaint,

It says the list of documents

jurisdictional allegations,

10

general allegations, first, second and third causes of

11

action and cover sheet.

12

Farm Bureau that is being pursued for liability purposes.

13

And none of those items alert

And I would, I would make that finding and I
Especially since Farm Bureau

14

think it's significant.

15

didn't do anything to oppose this joinder once it learned

16

that a joinder had been granted.

17

time to set aside the order.

18

didn't see a reason to because again the purpose for which

19

the order to join them was sought was to simply protect

20

its interests.

21

being pursued for breach of a contract, breach of the

22

covenant of good faith and fair dealing I have to use my

23

common sense and assume they would have opposed the motion

24

at that time.

25

It didn't seek at the

And my view of that is it

I think if Farm Bureau had perceived it was

I know that's not particularly critical in this

0049
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But I do

1

case to the statute of limitations argument.

2

think it is reflective of poor procedure in this case,

3

flawed procedure.

4

That procedure continues because even after the

5

order joining Farm Bureau is signed there's no amended

6

complaint that is submitted listing them.

7

isn't until the motion to dismiss is filed by Farm Bureau

8

that then there is a motion for leave to file an amended

9

complaint.

10

In fact, it

It's almost as though plaintiff did not perceive

11

the need to file a motion for leave to file an amended

12

complaint until it was tipped off in the motion to dismiss

13

that the complaint was defective.

14

Farm Bureau and didn't list any allegations.

15

it's like, it's almost like an epiphany, oh, yes, we've

16

got to, we've got

17

add them, and we've got to put in the reasons why we're

18

adding them.

19

articulated in the original motion for joinder.

20

that's troubling to me.

21

And it didn't list
And then

to amend the complaint and we've got to

Which, by the way, are reasons not
And

Having said what I have said, and in addition for

22

the reasons set out in Farm Bureau's motion to dismiss and

23

opposition to the motion for leave to file an amended

24

complaint, the court is going to grant the motion to

25

dismiss and further deny the motion to amend the complaint
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1

to add Farm Bureau, because to do so would be futile given

2

the statute of limitations that applies in this particular

3

case.

4

Mr. Belnap, may I turn to you and ask you if you

5

would be kind enough to prepare detailed findings and, and

6

an order consistent with my ruling this afternoon?

7

MR. BELNAP:

Yes, Your Honor.

And then also I

8

don't think there's any dispute that these documents we've

9

handed kind of put things into one place in the case, will

l.{JP

10
11
12
13

they go into the record, Your Honor?
THE JUDGE:
put in with the record.
MR. BELNAP:

I intend to have them scanned in and
You bet.
Thank you.

We will prepare an

Council, thank you .

14

order as you direct.

15

THE JUDGE:

.All right.

16

MR. BELNAP:

Thank you.

17

MR. COWDIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

18

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

19
20

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

========================

21
22

23
24

25
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•
REPORTER ' S CERTIFICATION

1
2

STATE OF UTAH

ss .

3

COUNTY OF UTAH
4
5

6

I , Penny C. Abbott , a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah , do hereby certify

8

that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in

9

the matter of Frugal Flamingo vs . Shipmen , hearing date May

10

4 , 2016 , and that I transcribed it into typ ewriting and that

11

a full , true and correct transcription of said hearing so

12

recorded and transcribed i s set forth in the foregoing pages

13

numbered 1 through 51 , inclusive , including where it is

14

indicated t hat the recor d ing was inaudible .

15

I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise

16

associated with any of the parties to this cause of action

17

and am not interested in the event thereof .

18
19

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 24th day of
Augu s t, 2016 .

20
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FROM" : FARM BUREAUCLAIMS

FAX l-0. :4357553617

Nov. 15 2011 02:SGPM

f l F .2 ~ - 30 3,S--:J--

P1/2

ILED-

ARNOL»&WADSWO .

A.TTORNEYS

\ MAv 04 201s

\

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

November 11, 2011

I, Naset Awa.db, on oi: about.
1•. Januaty 5, 2010 F.mployee TytiK Sbiprnon began stealing items from my b ~ s .

The Fmgal Fls.mingo.
2. Item.Cl that wete taken from the stoic include: 1X10ncy, tobacco, e-dgatctt.cs SII1d

c:atttidgcs, chips, Alcohol energy ddnb, csndy, non-alcoholic bevetagea, various
gmca:y itcr:ns, NFL c:ollectible items, household toj)etdcs, vitamins, JJ1Cdicines,

a.ndtoalcenhao.ce!ncnti.tems.
3. Tytis enlis~d the hdp £torn his son, his son's mends and his two girJ6:ienrl11 to

. help stcBl items from the stotc.
4. The theft continued foi: toughly 14 months without my knowledge.

5.. The total value of ite.tt>s ao.d money stolen &om the store totstls appmxitnatcly
$121. 3Z/.29.

6. I have sutveillance foomge documenting all the theft.

~l

7. · Aa of now I have incutted $5,000 in a.ttotney's fees. Thie SllI10UD.t will inaease if
further action is needed.

iI
l

i
i

i

I

I swear under penalty of perjury that based on infOID1ation and belief everything
contained herein is true and correct.
DATED this

.../1)_. day ofNovember, 2oi 1.
■

www.amoJdwatdsworth.com

~

•

I

-

••♦ -■ •

•

■■■-

-•

•

-

•

••

I

955 H. Chamhcn.Atl., Suire 220 South Ogden lJT R4403

I

-

-

■♦ I ■

Oo ♦ - ■

♦

801.475.0123
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FAX NO. :4357553617

FROM :FARM BUREAUO...Alr-6

"°"'·

~

15 2011 02:56PM

P2/2

NASBRAWADH
STATE OP ///J1f/
:SS
COUN1YOF.~

On this //) day of November 2011, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public of
said State duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared Naser Awadb. penonally known to
me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is
subscnoed to the within instramCDt, and acknowledges that he executed the same.
1n Witness Whf'l'COt: l have set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year in
this certificate first above written.

DEBBIE RENEE IIATHISOI

NOTARY PU8I.C • ffME af Uf.W

Mu-~-

Notary Public ~Mathison

. b0MPR9$0N ND. 801715
COMM. EXP. 10.0?-201•
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AWADH, NASER
4425 S 300 W
WASHINGTON TERRACE

UT 84405-5505

FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

CHECK NUMBER 0043085275
CHECK DATE
11/15/2011
CHECK AMT******$5,000.00

THIS CHECK IS FOR:
P#0005BOP600502001 R#4112844

INSD:AWADH, NASER
DOL:02/14/11 CLMT:AWADH, NASER

C#220000030357

Al

551UT

PAYEE AWADH, NASER

LINE OF BUSINESS BOP
COVERAGE
0001
CAUSE

OF LOSS

EY

MESSAGE:

REQUESTOR: WAG02111
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Brian E. Arnold, Bar No. 12019
Kara M. Nally, Bar No. 13560

ARNOLD &WADSWORTH
298 24™ Street, Ste. 230
Ogden, UT 84401
Tel:
801-475-0123
Fax:
800-381-5370
Arnold@arnoldwadsworth.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK
STOP,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO JOIN PARTIES

Case No. 110908653
Judge: Michael DiReda

TYTIS SHIPMON,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, by and through
undersigned counsel, hereby moves to join Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company as a party to
this action. A Memorandum in Support of this Motion is submitted herewith.
DATED this _ _ day of June, 2013

ARNOLD &WADSWORTH

Brian E. Arnold
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Brian E. Arnold:, Bar No. 12019
Kara M. Nally:, Bar No. 13560
ARNOLD & WADSWORTH
298 24TH Street, Ste. 230
Ogden, UT 84401
Tel:
801-475-0123
Fax:
800-381-5370
Arnold@arnoldwadsworth.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
.
STATE OF UTAH

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK
STOP,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO JOIN PARTIES

Plaintiff,

Case No. 110908653

vs.

Judge: Michael DiReda

TYTIS SHIPMON,
Defendants.

Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits the following
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Join Parties.
FACTS
1. On or before January 5

th

:,

2010, Defendant Tytis Shipman began stealing goods from

Plaintiffs ~ventory.
2. Defendant stole a substantial amount of goods over the course of a couple of months in
2010. Many of his actions were recorded on surveillance video.
3. As a result of his theft, Defendant's employment was terminated.
4. Plaintiff currently holds an insurance policy protecting it in the case of theft, damage, loss,
etc. from Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ("Farm Bureau").
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5. Plaintiff has filed a claim regarding the theft with Farm Bureau but has not received any
compensation for his loss.
6. This lawsuit was filed on December 71\ 2011.
ARGUMENT
Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[a]ll persons may join in one
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
questions oflaw or fact common to them all will arise in the action." Utah. R. Civ. P. 20. Rule 19
directs that all persons necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the action shall be joined as
parties. Utah. R. Civ. P. 19.
The purpose of joinder is to ensure that all parties who have a potential interest in the
dispute have a voice to be heard. See e.g.Johnson v. Higlry, 1999 UT App 278,989 P.2d 61. There
are two types of joinder: permissive and compulsory. Joinder is compulsory if the court determines
that the party sought to be added is a necessary party. Id A party is necessary if a complete
resolution of his or her rights, as well as those already party to the action, cannot be had without the
addition of the new party. Id The court must consider whether complete relief can be granted to
the parties in question without the addition of the new party, and whether the proposed new parties'
rights would be c<;>mpromised by the resolution of the action without their involvement. See e.g.
Accordingly, the court looks to the circumstances of the case to determine whether joinder is
feasible and if so, whether it is necessary to avoid prejudice to the proposed added party. Id For
permissible joinder, the court need only determine whether the claim for relief arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Utah R. Civ. P. 20(a).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff holds a policy insuring it against loss; the policy was issued by
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Agency. As a result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff has incurred
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losses of at least $121,327.29. Plaintiff has filed a claim with the insurance agency but has yet to
receive any reimbursement for its losses from any source. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action
against Mr. Shipmon in an attempt to recoup its losses. Without a doubt, Plaintiff is entitled to
some compensation for its loss but is admittedly not entitled to "double dip." As it was Defendant's
intentional acts which caused Plaintiff's damages, he is ultimately responsible for the losses incurred.

If any funds are paid out to Plaintiff by Farm Bureau, Farm Bureau may be entitled to
indemnification pending the results of the immediate action. Accordingly, it should be allowed to be
joined in this action to preserve its rights against Mr. Shipmon. If Farm Bureau is not allowed to
join this lawsuit, their ability to seek indemnification against Defendant may be compromised.
Even if this Court finds that Farm Bureau is not a necessary party to this action, joinder is
still permissible, because the claim in which both Plaintiff and Farm Bureau has an interest in arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence - namely, Defendant's theft of money and property from
Plaintiff. All of Plaintiff's losses can be traced back to Defendant's actions. Any funds paid out by
Farm Bureau in accordance with the policy held by Plaintiff can be traced back to the actions of
Defendant. As all the losses can be traced to a single pattern of conduct, it is permissible for Farm
Bureau to be joined as a party to this action.
CONCLUSION
As both ~e Frugal Flamingo and Farm Bureau have an interest in securing a judgment
against Defendant for the funds lost and because all losses arise of the same transaction and
occurrence, it is appropriate that Farm Bureau be joined as a party to this action.
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DATED this 26 th day of January, 2014.
ARNOLD & WADSWORTH

Brian E. Arnold
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27 day of January, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed first class, postage prepaid to:
J.D. Poonnan
3856 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403

4v
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Expedited Process Service
PO Box53
Bountiful, Utah 84011

Phone (801) 815-2442
tkwynn82(a)gmail.com

PROOF OF SERVICE
Second District Court, Weber County

110908653

Name of Court

Case#

The Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop

Tytis Shipman

Plaintiff/ Petitioner

Defendant/ Res ondent

J Daniel Niebuhr, first being duly sworn, depose and say: that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action, and
that within the boundaries of the state where service was affected, I was authorized by law to perform said service.

I Service: I served: I CT Corporation
With (list documents): Order Joining Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company; Complaint; Jurisdictional Allegations;
General Allegations; First, Second and Third Cause of Actions; Cover Sheet for Civil Action

By leaving with:

Trisha Fuller

Secretary

Name

Relations hi

I Time: I 11:00

I Date: I September 23, 2015
Residence
Business

1108 East South Union Blvd

Midvale

Address

City/State

Manner of Service:
~Personal
□ Substituted at Home
Service Fee
$
Additional Services $
Mileage Fee
$
Total
$

@

Substituted at Work

□ Posting

ONon-Service

□ Certified Mail

50.00

*
25.00
75.00

I Firm: I Arnold, Wadsworth &Coggins
I Notes:

******

..

I have not incJuded any non-public information from this document.
I declare under penalty of Utah Code Section 78B-5-705 that everything stated in this document is true .

*****

Date
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DATBD 1his z"1 J?a~of Scp~ber. 2015.
ARNOIDW.ADSWORTH&COGGINS .

-~wdin
Attorney fot Plaintiff
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Brian Arnold,. Bar No.: 12019
Jacob~ Co~ BarNo. 14964

C{

\Q'·90am ·

i

·

ARNOLD WAl)SWOR.TH COOOlNS
298 '24lllStre.ot, Suite 2,0

.H~ I°:)< ~o.~ i LN.Tc...,.

. Qgg.~ "OT 84401
Tel:
-F~:
B:

I~<tf 15

801475~123
80~3.81·5370.

aniold@ariioJdwadsworth.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE:SECOND JDDICIAL ;l)ISTRICT·COURT,:WEBER COUNTY
OGDQDIViS«).N;.STATE QF UTAH
\•'".

TUE . .UQ~ nAMiNoo QUICK
STOP,.
.

'

'',

'

.. 'OJO)ER~O-f}F.,BinmA.U' '
'MUTli~:JNSUBANcli·c.9MPANY·

Plalil~
v.

Case No.:. 110908653

·TYUS S)JIPMON, .•

,Judgei:MJcbtfel:~'l.f

.Defendant..

WHERE¥()~.. Plaintiff· filed· hie Motion to Join.'Farm Buroau. .Mutual Insurance
· Company as

fl· party

to the ins~

action on_iimuill'y 27, 2014.. No· response or objection Wlla
.

.

s~b.sequently· filed by My other party. Accordlngly., after QQnsidenog the pleadings and other

good cause app~g. tho <;ourt hereby Orders as follows:.
'-'

Farm Bureau.Mutuaf ~~ Comp~ shaU be joined as aparty to the instant action.

::.'
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Brian Arnold, Bar No. 12019
Jacob K. Cowdin, Bar No. 14964
ARNOLD WADSWORTH & COGGINS
298 24th Street, Ste. 230
Ogden, UT 84401
Tel:
801-475-0123
Fax: 801-381-5370
E:
arnold@amoldwadsworth.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK
STOP,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
Case No. 110908653
v.
Judge: Michael DiReda
TYTIS SHIPMON, an individual; FARM
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation;
Defendant.

Plaintiff, The Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop, a DBA, (hereinafter "Plaintiff' or "The Frugal
Flamingo"), by and through attorneys Brian Arnold and Jacob Cowdin of Arnold, Wadsworth &
Coggins, hereby c·omplains and alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1. The Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop is licensed to do business in Utah.

2. Tytis Shipman (hereinafter ''Defendant") is an individual residing in Weber County, Utah.
3. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Farm Bureau" or ''Defendant") is a
corporation doing business in the State of Utah and incorporated in the State oflowa.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. Jurisdiction is proper with this court pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-5-102.
5. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-3-304.
FACTS
1. The Plaintiff, The Frugal Flamingo Quick Stop, is a convenient store located in Washington

Terrace, Utah.
2. Defendant Tytis Shipman was an employee of The Frugal Flamingo during the time alleged.
3. Plaintiff became aware of Defendant, via security camera recording, stealing merchandise,
food and drinks, money, and other items from The Frugal Flamingo.
4. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, via security camera recording, stealing nearly every
shift he worked over the course of approximately fourteen months.
5. Mr. Shipman was in a position of trust where he knew he would not report anything to anyone
and therefore took advantage of his position.
6. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, via security camera recording, holding onto payments
for merchandise from customers. He would then void out the receipts to show an even till.
On information and belief, the total amount withheld from the register is $10,138.78, however
it could be higher as the review of surveillance footage is still incomplete.
7. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmen, via security camera recording, taking cases of
electronic cigarettes cartridge refills and electronic cigarette initial kits.
8. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmen, via security camera recording, talcing individual packs
and cartons of cigarettes.
9. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmen, via security camera recording, taking smokeless
tobacco products by the case or individual cans.
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10. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmon, via security camera recording, taking bags of potato
chips.
11. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmon, via security camera recording, taking cases of alcohol.
12. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmon, via security camera recording, taking various brands,
styles, and sizes of energy drinks.
13. Plaintiff became aware ofMr. Shipmon, via security camera recording, allowing Mr. Shipman's
son to take candy out of the store without paying.
14. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, Mr. Shipman's son, and Mr. Shipman's girlfriend, via
security camera recording, taking various sizes, styles, and brands of bottled drink products;
including, but not limited to, soda, juices, and nutrient enhanced drinks.
15. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, via security camera recording, taking various grocery
items; including, but not limited to, cooking supplies, fresh produce, canned groceries, cookies,
and pastries.
16. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, via security camera recording, taking NFL collectible
items, car accessories, home decor items, and personal jewelry accessories.
17. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipman, via security camera recording, taking various
household toiletries, cleaning supplies, and personal care items.
18. Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Shipmon, via security camera recording, taking vitamins, overthe-counter medicines, and male enhancement products.
19. Plaintiff discovered $7,000.00 missing from the safe. When reviewing the surveillance footage,
Plaintiff noticed Mr. Shipmon take the key to the safe, enter the area of the store where the
safe is kept, then return the key to the safe a few minutes later.
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20. \Vhen Plaintiff confronted Mr. Shipman regarding the missing items, Mr. Shipman denied
having any involvement.
21. Plaintiff relied on Mr. Shipman's statement regarding the missing items and continued to
employ him.
22. Mr. Shipman has subsequently admitted to having unlawfully taken the merchandise, items,
~

profits, and/ or other assets detailed above.
23. The Frugal Flamingo is insured by Defendant Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.
24. Contrary to the terms of the policy, Farm Bureau refused to provide any compensation to
Plaintiff for the loss of merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets admittedly taken by
Mr. Shipman from The Frugal Flamingo.
25. To this day, Farm Bureau has continued to refuse to provide compensation to Plaintiff for its
losses as a result of Mr. Shipman's actions.
26. To this day, Plaintiffs have not received any compensation from any source for the losses
incurred by Mr. Shipman's actions, despite The Frugal Flamingo being duly insured.
27. Since Mr. Shipman's actions occurred, Plaintiffs have been deprived of the use and value of
the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets improperly taken by Mr. Shipman.

CAUSE OF ACTION #1
Conversion

28. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
29. In Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin. Inc., 1999 UT 13, iJ 20, 974 P.2d 288, the court defined
conversion as "an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession."

Q;)
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30. Mr. Shipmen willfully interference with Plaintiffs chattel by intentionally removing items,
such as cigarettes, alcohol, and food from the store.
31. Mr. Shipmen was aware he would be detected if items came up missing, thus he used and
manipulated his position in the store to systematically steal nearly every shift he worked.
32. Plaintiff has never given Mr. Shipmen permission to remove items from the store.
33. Mr. Shipmen did not have lawful justification to interfere with Plaintiffs chattel.
34. Plaintiff is now deprived of the use and possession of the chattel and suffered monetary
damages in the amount of $121,327.29.
CAUSE OF ACTION #2
Fraud

35. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
36. In, Armed Forces Inc. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35, 40, "the elements that a
party must allege 'to bring a claim sounding in fraud' are (1) that a representation was made
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the
representer either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was
insufficient knowledge upon with to base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that
party's injury and damage.
a.

Statement ~[Material Fact

37. Mr. Shipmen misrepresented to Plaintiff that he would not take property from the store.
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38. Whether Mr. Shipman would take property from the store was material because Plaintiff
would not have hired Mr. Shipman had he known Mr. Shipman had intended to take property
from the store.

b.

The Statement was False or Reckless

39. Mr. Shipman knew the statement was false or made it with reckless disregard for its truth
because, on information and belief, Mr. Shipman had the intention to take property from the
store.
40. Mr. Shipman knew, because of his position at the store, that he would not have supervision
and would therefore have the opportunity to steal property from the Plaintiff.

c.

The Statement was Made with Intent for the Plaintiff to &/yon it

41. Mr. Shipman made the false statement about stealing the property with the intent for Plaintiff
to rely on it order to induce the initial hiring of Mr. Shipman. If Plaintiff had known that Mr.
Shipman had the intention to steal property from the store, he would have not employed Mr.
Shipman.

d

R.easonable R.eliance

42. Plaintiff reasonably relied on the statements above to its detriment.

e.

Damages

43. On information and belief, the theft of the property caused Plaintiff damages such as lost
profits and loss of income.
44. But for the theft of the property, on information and belief, Plaintiffs damages would not
have occurred and Plaintiff incurred additional damages by continuing to employ Mr.
Shipman.

~
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CAUSE OF ACTION #3
Civil Conspiracy
45. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
46. In Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), the court defined
the elements of civil conspiracy as (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to
be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object of course of action, (4) one or more
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.
47. Mr. Shipman, along with his girlfriend, son, and son's girlfriend, conspired together to steal
from the Frugal Flamingo.
48. Their objective was to conspire together to be able to steal as much property from the store
as possible.
49. There was a meeting of the minds among the individuals to steal from the Frugal Flamingo.
On information and belief, these individuals got together, planned and schemed, their
intention all along being to permanently deprive the Plaintiff of its property.
50. There were several instances viewed via security camera that shows the other actors taking
items out of the store that were left in a bag for them by Mr. Shipman.
51. As a result of the actions by all, Plaintiff suffered damages.

CAUSE OF ACTION #4
Breach Of Contract
52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
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53. Plaintiff and Defendant Farm Bureau are parties to a contract wherein Farm Bureau provides
insurance coverage in exchange for Plaintiff paying a monthly premium.
54. Plaintiff has timely paid all the required premiums and has been current on the premiums at
all times relevant to this action.
55. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs have acted in accordance with the terms of the
insurance contract.
56. Per the terms of the insurance coverage, Defendant Farm Bureau is to reimburse Plaintiff for
loss or damage to its property. The policy states specifically, "we [Farm Bureau] cover direct
physical loss to or of covered property caused by theft, attempted theft, and loss ofpropertJ from a

known location when it is like/y that the properry has been stolen." (emphasis added).
57. After Plaintiff discovered Mr. Shipmon was the party taking merchandise, items, profits,
and/ or other assets, Plaintiff filed a claim seeing reimbursement for the losses in accordance
with its policy with Farm Bureau.
58. Defendant Farm Bureau denied the claim and refused to provide any compensation for
Plaintiffs loss.
59. To date, Plaintiff has not received any compensation for its losses.
60. As a result of Defendant Farm Bureau's failure to honor the Policy, Plaintiff has been deprived
of its ability to replace the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets taken by Mr.
Shipmon.
61. As a result of Defendant Farm Bureau's failure to honor the Policy, Plaintiff has been deprived
of the value of the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets taken by Mr. Shipman, an
amount no less than $233,421.14.
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62. As a result of Defendant Farm Bureau's failure to abide by the terms of the insurance
agreement ("Policy''), Plaintiff have suffered damages in an amount no less than $233,421.14.

CAUSE OF ACTION #5
Breach Of The Duty Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing
63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
64. Plaintiff and Defendant Farm Bureau are in a contractual relationship whereby Plaintiff pays
premiums to Farm Bureau in exchange for Farm Bureau providing insurance coverage against
the loss of Plaintiffs property.
65. "An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract. Under the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both parties to a contract impliedly promise not to
intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the
contract." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Co,p., 2004 UT 28 ,r14, 94 P.3d 193 (internal citations
omitted).
66. The good faith performance doctrine permits the exercise of discretion for any purposeincluding ordinary business purposes - reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.
Thus, a contract would be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its
discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range - a reason beyond the risks assumed
by the party claiming the breach. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379 ,r34, 173 P.3d 865
(emphasis omitted)(internal quotes omitted).
67. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is breached when a party to a contract acts in such a
way which denies the other party from receiving the benefit of the agreement. Id at ,r 18.
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68. "In the insurance context, the implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at
the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. The duty of good faith also requires the insurer to
deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting and to
refrain from actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract."

Colony Ins. Co.

v. Human Ensemble,

LLC, 2013 UT App 681f 10,299 P.3d 1149.

69. In this case, the benefit of the bargain for Plaintiff was receiving reimbursement of the costs
of its lost property.
70. Farm Bureau did not undergo a timely or diligent investigation; however, Farm Bureau
ultimately concluded that they had insufficient evidence that Mr. Shipmen in fact did what he
has subsequently admitted to doing: unlawfully taking merchandise, items, profits, and/or
other assets from The Frugal Flamingo.
71. Although Plaintiff it is clear Mr. Shipmen unlawfully took merchandise, items, profits, and/ or
other assets, thereby constituting theft, theft is not a required proof for Plaintiff to recover
pursuant to the Policy. The Policy also directs that Plaintiff is insured against " .. .loss of
property from a known location when it is likely that the property has been stolen."
72. As stated above, the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets were taken from
Plaintiffs convenient store by Mr. Shipmon. Plaintiff had not authorized any person to use,
possess, or remove the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets taken by Mr. Shipmen
from The Frugal Flamingo's property or inventory. Under these circumstances, it is very
apparent Mr. Shipmon stole merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets from The Frugal
Flamingo. Accordingly, the losses would be covered by Plaintiffs insurance policy.
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73. Defendant Farm Bureau is bound by the duty of good faith and fair dealing to act as a
reasonable insurer.
74. By failing to perform a full and fair investigation of Plaintiffs claim regarding the loss of
merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets, and thereafter to reimburse Plaintiff for the
losses, Defendant Fann Bureau breached its duty to treat Plaintiffs with the utmost good faith
and fair dealing.

~

75. Defendant Farm Bureau's failure to comply with the duty of good faith and fair dealing
deprived Plaintiff of the benefit of the insurance contract, namely reimbursement for loss of
property.
76. As a result of Defendant Farm Bureau's failure to comply with the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and as a result of Defendant's failure to honor the Policy, Plaintiff has been deprived
of its ability to replace the merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets taken by Mr.
Shipman.
77. As a result of Defendant's failure to abide by the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff
have been deprived of the value of the taken merchandise, items, profits, and/ or other assets,
an amount no less than $233,421.14.
78. As a result of Defendant's failure to abide by the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff
has suffered damages in an amount no less than $233,421.14.

CAUSE OF ACTION #6
Bad Faith
79. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations and facts contained
hereinabove.
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80. The acts and omissions of Defendant Farm Bureau as complained of herein, and yet to be
further discovered in this matter, constitute bad faith.
81. Plaintiff sustained damages in excess of the Farm Bureau policy limits as a result of Defendant
Farm Bureau's bad faith.
82. Plaintiff is further entitled to punitive damages as a result of Defendant Farm Bureau's bad
faith.
83. Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to commence this action and
is entitled to attorney fees and costs.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Court find the following:
a. Actual damages against Defendant Mr. Shipmon for the amount of items stolen of
not less than $233,421.14.
b. On their Fourth Claim for Relief, judgment against Defendant Farm Bureau in favor
of Plaintiff in an amount to be established at trial, but not less than $233,421.14 plus pre-and
post-judgment interest as provided by Utah law;
c. On their Fifth Claim for Relief, for judgment against Defendant Farm Bureau in
favor of Plaintiff in an amount to be established at trial, but not less than $233,421.14, plus
pre-and post-judgment interest as provided by Utah law; in addition to actual, consequential,
special, punitive and incidental damages.
d. Plaintiff's requested damages qualify as a Tier 3 as defined by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
e. Treble damages;
f. Joint and severable liability;
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g. For Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs; and
h. For such other relief as is appropriate under Utah law.

DATED this 11 th Day ofJanuary, 2016.
ARNOLD WADSWORTH & COGGINS

Brian E. Arnold, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20160540
THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP vs. TYTIS SHIPMON
CASE NUMBER 110908653 Miscellaneous

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
MICHAEL D DIREDA
PARTIES
Plaintiff -

THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP

Represented by: BRIAN E ARNOLD
Represented by: JACOB K COWDIN
Defendant - TYTIS SHIPMON
Other Party -

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS CO - DISMISSED

Represented by: PAUL M BELNAP
Represented by: NICHOLAS E DUDOICH
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
Amount Due:

595.00

Amount Paid:

595.00

Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

TOTAL REVENUE

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT s
Amount Due:

360.00

Amount Paid:

360.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
t;jj

Amount Due:

10.00

Amount Paid:

10.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL

-

TYPE: APPEAL

Amount Due:

225.00

Amount Paid:

225.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

CASE NOTE
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:14
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CASE NUMBER 110908653 Miscellaneous

PROCEEDINGS

12-07-11 Case filed
12-07-11 Judge MICHAEL D DIREDA assigned.
12-07-11 Filed: Complaint
12-07-11 Fee Account created
12-07-11 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S

Total Due:

360.00

Payment Received:

360.00

Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
12-23-11 Filed return: Return on Summons
Party Served: SHIPMON, TYTIS
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: December 21, 2011
01-09-12 Filed: Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint
TYTIS SHIPMON

05-14-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendants' Initial
Disclosures
06-05-12 Filed: Defendant's Initial Disclosures (Pursuant to Rule
26 (a) (1))
01-15-13 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal
04-16-13 Filed: Appearance of Counsel
04-16-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-14-13 Notice - Notice of Intent for Case 110908653
Clerk:

SHANNON ETHRIDGE

Notice is hereby given that the above entitled matter will be
dismissed pursuant to Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-103
for failure to file a certificate of readiness for trial within 330
days of defendant's answer.

Unless a certificate of readiness for

trial or written statement showing good cause not to dismiss is
received by the court within 20 days of this notice, the court will
dismiss without further notice.
11-14-13 Filed: Notice of Intent to Dismiss
12-03-13 Filed: Response to Notice of Intent
12-03-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-04-13 Filed: Notice Regarding Objection to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss
12-11-13 Note: The case was taken off of OTSC hold
01-10-14 Filed: Notice of Deposition
01-10-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:14
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CASE NUMBER 110908653 Miscellaneous
01-27-14 Filed: Motion to Join Parties
Filed by: THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP,
01-27-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-13-14 Filed: Notice of Intent to Dismiss
08-13-14 Notice - Notice of Intent for Case 110908653
Clerk:

ZOILA BURTON

Notice is hereby given that, due to inactivity, the above entitled
matter may be dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule
4-103, Code of Judicial Administration.

Unless a written statement

is received by the court within 20 days of this notice showing good
cause why this should not be dismissed, the court will dismiss
without further notice.
09-05-14 Filed: Objection to Notice of Intent to Dismiss and Request for
Hearing
09-05-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-10-14 Note: Clerk spoke with Mr. Arnold's office. Defendant is
represented by JD Poorman, who is now deceased. Mr.
Arnold's office will try and find contact information for
the defendant and requests case not be dismissed.
09-11-14 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint
09-11-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-01-14 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint
10-01-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-03-14 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on December 17, 2014 at 08:30 AM
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
11-03-14 Filed: Notice for Case 110908653 ID 16282282
12-03-14 Note: Defendant contacted the Court regarding the telephone
conference set on 12/17 and updated the court regarding

~

his phone number
12-17-14 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on January 14, 2015 at 08:30 AM
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
12-17-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for LAW
Judge:
Clerk:

&

MOTION HEARING continu

MICHAEL DIREDA
zoilab

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Defendant(s): TYTIS SHIPMON
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRIAN E ARNOLD
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:14
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CONTINUANCE

Whose Motion:
The Stipulation of counsel.
Reason for continuance:
Court Ordered
Matter continued to 1/14/15 at 8:30 a.m. to allow the defendant
more time to hire counsel.
~

The motion is granted.
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/14/2015
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT

84401

before Judge MICHAEL DIREDA
12-19-14 Filed: Notice for Case 110908653 ID 16376833
01-14-15 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE continued to February 04, 2015 at 08:45 AM
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
01-14-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for LAW
Judge:
Clerk:

&

MOTION HEARING continu

MICHAEL DIREDA
zoilab

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Defendant(s): TYTIS SHIPMON
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRIAN E ARNOLD

CONTINUANCE

Whose Motion:
The Court.
Reason for continuance:
Court Ordered
Matter continued to 2/4/15 at 8:45 a.m. as the parties are
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:15
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CASE NUMBER 110908653 Miscellaneous
attempting to resolve the case. Defendant does not have counsel and
wants to settle the matter.
The motion is granted.
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 02/04/2015
Time: 08:45 a.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT

84401

Before Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA
02-04-15 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on July 20, 2015 at 09:00 AM in 2nd Floor
Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
02-04-15 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on July 21, 2015 at 09:00 AM in 2nd Floor
Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
02-04-15 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on June 10, 2015 at 01:30 PM in
2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
02-04-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Judge:
Clerk:

MICHAEL DIREDA
zoilab

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Defendant(s): TYTIS SHIPMON
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACOB K COWDIN

Bench Trial set on 7/20/15 and 7/21/15 at 9:00 a.m.
Pretrial conference set on 6/10/15 at 1:30 p.m.
The defendant states that he thinks he made an offer which will be
accepted.

BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 07/20/2015
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:15
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Ogden, UT

84401

Before Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 07/21/2015
Ti me : O9 : OO a . m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT

84401

G:J

Before Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 06/10/2015
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT

84401

Before Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA
02-26-15 Note: The case was taken off of OTSC hold
06-10-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
Clerk:

MICHAEL DIREDA
jamieat

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRIAN E ARNOLD
Audio
Tape Number:

2D06102015

Tape Count: 2:10-2:12
~

Plaintiff 1 s attorney appeared presenting a stipulation before the
Court signed by the defendant.
Plaintiff's attorney will file the settlement agreement with the
court.
Bench Trial is stricken.

06-10-15 BENCH TRIAL Cancelled.
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:15
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06-23-15 Case Disposition is Granted
Disposition Judge is MICHAEL D DIREDA
06-23-15 Filed: Signed Stipulation
06-23-15 Filed: Stolen Items Part 1
06-23-15 Filed: Stolen Items Part 2
06-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-26-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance
08-26-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Motion to Join
08-26-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
~

08-26-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Joining Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company
08-26-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-26-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-27-15 Filed: Other - Unsigned Order (Proposed) Joining Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company
08-27-15 Note: At least one required document is missing from this
filing. Motion has not been filed.
08-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-27-15 Note: Motion filed 1/27/14 - Order to be resubmitted.
08-27-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Joining Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company
08-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08-31-15 Note: Order to join Farm Bureau forwarded to judge for review.
08-31-15 Filed order: Order Joining Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
Judge MICHAEL D DIREDA
Signed August 31, 2015
08-31-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-06-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon TRISHA, SECRETARY FOR CT
CORPORATION for
Party Served:

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS CO

Service Type: Personal
Service Date: September 23, 2015
10-06-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-11-15 Filed: Motion to Dismiss
Filed by: FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS CO,
12-11-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-28-15 Filed: Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defendants
Motion to Dismiss
Filed by: THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP,
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:15
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12-28-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
01-11-16 Filed: Amended Complaint
01-11-16 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Counter Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint
01-11-16 Filed: Response to Motion to Dismiss and Counter Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint
01-11-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-23-16 Filed: Memorandum Farm Bureaus Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss
02-23-16 Filed: Memorandum Farm Bureaus Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
02-23-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-08-16 Filed: Reply Memorandum Support Plaintiffs Counter Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint
03-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-10-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit for Decision (Defendants Motion
to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint)
03-10-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-23-16 HEARING ON MOTIONS scheduled on May 04, 2016 at 02:00 PM in 2nd
Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
03-23-16 Filed: Notice for Case 110908653 ID 17329638
05-04-16 Filed: Farm Bureau Supporting Documents 5/4/2016 Hearing
05-04-16 Minute Entry - HEARING ON MOTIONS
Judge:
Clerk:

MICHAEL D DIREDA
jamieat

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP
Defendant(s): TYTIS SHIPMON
Plaintiff's Attorney{s): JACOB K COWDIN
Other Parties: PAUL M BELNAP
Audio
Tape Number:

2D 05042016

Tape Count: 2:05-3:13

Attorney Belnap addresses the court on the motion dismiss.
Attorney Cowdin addresses the issue regarding notice.
Court finds the cause of action against Farm Bureau commenced in
2011 after the check was rendered and that the motion to amend as
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:16
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well as the complaint needed to have been filed by November 2014.
Court finds the motion to join Farm Bureau to the action was not
appropriately delivered to them, and the contents was to protect
Farm Bureau's interest rather than for liability reasons.
Court grants the motion to dismiss and deny•s the motion to amend
the complaint.
Attorney Belnap to file the findings and order.

~

05-19-16 Filed: Order (Proposed) Dismissing Claims Against Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company
05-19-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
05-24-16 Note: Order Dismissing Claims Against Farm Bureau Mutal
Insurance Company to MDD.
06-02-16 Fee Account created
06-02-16 AUDIO TAPE COPY

Total Due:

10.00

Payment Received:

10.00

06-02-16 Note: Copy of 5/4/2016 hearing was made for Frugal Flamingo,
called and placed in the basket for pick up.
06-07-16 Filed order: Order Dismissing Claims Against Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company
Judge MICHAEL D DIREDA
Signed June 07, 2016
06-07-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-09-16 Dismissed party - FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS
06-24-16 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil
06-24-16 Fee Account created

(not Interlocutory}

Total Due:

225.00

Payment Received:

06-24-16 APPEAL

225.00

06-24-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
@ 06-27-16 Note: Notice of Appeal sent to COA.

06-28-16 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court to Brian Arnold
06-28-16 Filed: Order (Supreme Court)
07-08-16 Filed: Certificate of Transcript Request
07-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-14-16 Filed: Letter to Brian Arnold from Utah Court of Appeals
08-26-16 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 05-04-2016
09-20-16 Note: Appealed: Case #20160540
10-05-16 Filed: Judgment (Proposed) and Order on Stipulation
10-05-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-07-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:16
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10-07-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-07-16 Filed: Response to Proposed Judgment
10-07-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-12-16 Filed: Other - Not Signed Judgment (Proposed) and Order on
Stipulation
10-12-16 Note: Judgment on Order on Stipulation filed unsigned as the
stipulation has not been filed.
10-12-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-17-16 Filed: Answer
TYTIS SHIPMON

10-21-16 Filed: Judgment (Proposed) and Order on Stipulation
10-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-25-16 Note: Judgment to MDD.
11-01-16 Filed judgment: Judgment and Order on Stipulation
Judge MICHAEL D DIREDA
Signed November 01, 2016
11-01-16 Judgment #1 Entered$ 223398.00
Creditor: THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP
Debtor:

TYTIS SHIPMON

-10,023.14 PaymentMade
233,421.14 Principal
223,398.00 Judgment Grand Total
11-01-16 Filed: Return of .Electronic Notification
11-08-16 Filed: Objection to Decision
11-29-16 Filed: Motion Ex Parte Motion for Hearing to Identify Judgment
Debtors Property
Filed by: THE FRUGAL FLAMINGO QUICK STOP,

11-29-16 Filed: ~x Parte Order (Proposed) Scheduling Hearing to Identify
Judgement Debtors Property
11-29-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-06-16 Filed order: Ex Parte Order Scheduling Hearing to Identify
Judgement Debtors Property
Judge MICHAEL D DIREDA

Signed December 06, 2016
12-14-16 Filed: Notice of Hearing
12-14-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
01-05-17 Filed: Proof of Service - Supplemental Orders Documents
01-05-17 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Printed: 06/21/17 15:59:16
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01-10-17 Note: Notified counsel of incorrect supp order date.
01-10-17 Filed: Notice of Hearing
01-10-17 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
01-20-17 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER scheduled on March 28, 2017 at 02:00 PM in
2nd Floor Southeast with Commissioner CONKLIN.
02-07-17 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER Cancelled.
Reason: Counsel's request.
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Utah Code

Vb
Effective 5/1212015
31A-21-313 Limitation of actions.
(1)
(a) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance shall be commenced within
three years after the inception of the loss.
(b) The inception of the loss on a fidelity bond is the date the insurer first denies all or part of a
claim made under the fidelity bond.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of
actions in Title 788, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies.
(3) An insurance policy may not:
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less than that authorized by
statute;
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration provisions in
contracts.
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will arise from a
delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no action
may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel payment under the policy
until the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties conduct an appraisal or
arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties.

Amended by Chapter 244, 2015 General Session
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve
an answer within 21 days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and
within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within 21 days after the service. The plaintiff shall
serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 21 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered
by the court, within 21 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a
motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding
to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the t~ial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action;
{a){2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be
served within 14 days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency
of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading
if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief.
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) - (7) in subdivision (b) of this rule,
whether made iri a pleading or by motion, and the.motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule
shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings
and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so
vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may
move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed
within 14 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 21 days after the service of the
pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.

(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include
therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall
not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in
subdivision {h) of this rule.
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(h) Waiver: of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been
received.

(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion
made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or
is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and
charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the
reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No
security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30
days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the
action.

~
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments before trial.
(a)(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(a)(1 )(A) 21 days after serving it; or
(a){1)(8) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of
a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier.
(a)(2) In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the court's permission or the
opposing party's written consent. The party must attach its proposed amended pleading to the motion to
permit an amended pleading. The court should freely give permission when justice requires.
(a)(3) Any required response to an amended pleading must be filed within the time remaining to
respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever is later.
(b) Amendments during and after trial.
(b)(1) When an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or implied consent, it
must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move-at any time, even after
judgment-to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.
(b)(2) If, at trial, a party objects that evidence is not within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court
may permit the pleadings to be amended. The court should freely permit an amendment when doing so will
aid in presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would
prejudice that party's action or defense on the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
objecting party to meet the evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:
(c)(1) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(c)(2) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading; or
(c)(3) the amendment adds a party, substitutes a party, or changes the name of the party against
whom a claim is asserted, if paragraph (c)(2) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(b) for
serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(c)(3)(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits;
and
(c)(3)(8) !<new or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a
mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a

party to file a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the
date of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the original
pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing party respond to the
supplemental pleading within a specified time.
Advisory Committee Notes

Effective November 1, 2016

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp015.html
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6/21/2017

